Foreword
THE WARREN COMMISSION
CONTENTS
I. OPERATIONS AND PROCEDURES
CREATION OF THE WARREN COMMISSION
The thing I am concerned about, and so is Mr. Katzenbach* is having something issued so we can convince the public that Oswald is the real assassin. Mr Katzenbach thinks that the President might appoint a Presidential Commission of three outstanding citizens to make a determination. I countered with a suggestion that we make an investigative report to the Attorney General with pictures, laboratory work, and so forth. Then the Attorney General can make the report to the President and the President can decide whether to make it public. I felt this was better because there are several aspects which would complicate our foreign relations, if we followed the Presidential Commission route. (2)
I think*** speculation that there was conspiracy of various kinds was fairly rampant, at that time particularly in the foreign press. I was reacting to that and I think reacting to repeated calls from people in the State Department who wanted something of that kind in an effort to quash the beliefs of some people abroad that the silence in the face of those rumors was not to be taken as substantiating it in some way. That is, in the face of a lot of rumors about conspiracy, a total silence on the subject from the Government neither confirming nor denying tended to feed those rumors. I would have liked a statement of the kind I said, that nothing we had uncovered so far leads to believe that there is a conspiracy, but investigation is continuing; everything will be put out on the table. (3)
I had numerous reports from the Bureau of things that were going on. Again, I cannot exactly tell you the time frame on this, but there were questions of Oswald's visit to Russia, marriage to Marina, and the visit to Mexico City, the question as to whether there was any connection between Ruby and Oswald, how in hell the police could have allowed that to happen.
Those were the sorts of considerations at least that we had during that period of time, I guess. The question as it came along as the result of all those things was whether this was some kind of conspiracy, whether foreign powers could be involved, whether it was a right-wing conspiracy, whether it was a leftwing conspiracy, whether it was the right wing trying to put out the conspiracy on the left wing or the left wing trying to put the conspiracy on the right wing, whatever that may have been. There were many rumors around. There were many speculations around, all of which were problems. (4)
It is important that all of the facts surrounding President Kennedy's assassination be made public in a way which will satisfy people in the United States and abroad. That all the facts have been told and that a statement to this effect be made now.
1. The public must be satisfied that Oswald was the assassin; that he did not have confederates who are still at large; that the evidence was such that he would have been convicted at trial.
* * * * * * * * * *
3. The matter has been handled thus far with neither dignity nor conviction; facts have been mixed with rumor and speculation. We can scarcely let the world see us totally in the image of the Dallas police when our President is murdered. I think this objective may be satisfied and made public as soon as possible with the completion of a thorough FBI report on Oswald and the assassination. This may run into the difficulty of pointing to inconsistency between this report and statements by Dallas Police offcials; but the reputation of the Bureau is such that it may do the whole job. The only other step would be the appointment of a Presidential commission of unimpeachable personnel to review and examine the evidence and announce its conclusion. This has both advantages anddisadvantages. I think it can await publication of the FBI report and public reaction to it here and abroad. I think, however, that a statement and the facts will be made public property in an orderly and responsible way; it should be madenow; we need something to head off public speculation or congressional hearings of the wrong sort. (6)
Perhaps I am repeating myself, but everybody appeared to believe that Lee Harvey Oswald had acted alone fairly early. There were rumors of conspiracy. Now, either Lee Harvey Oswald acted alone or he was part of a conspiracy, one of the two, or somebody else was involved.
If he acted alone and if that was in fact true, then the problem you had was how do you allay all the rumors of conspiracy. If he, in fact, was part of a conspiracy, you damned well wanted to know what the conspiracy was, who was involved in it, and that would have given you another set of problems.
The problem that I focused on for the most part was the former one because they kept saying he acted alone. How do you explain? You have to put all of this out with all your explanations because you have all of these associations and all of that is said, you put out all the facts, why you come to that conclusion. I say this because the conclusion would have been a tremendously important conclusion to know.
If some foreign government was behind this, that may have presented major problems. It was of major importance to know that. I want to emphasize that both sides had a different set of problems. If there was a conspiracy, the problem was not rumors of conspiracy. The problem was rumors. Everything had to be gone into. (7)
I saw Lyndon Johnson within a few days after he assumed the Presidency. Waggoner Carr had been *** [interruption]*** heard was that naturally the President--President Johnson--was tremendously concerned over whathappened in Dallas from the standpoint of people understanding what really happened. Here and in Europe were all kinds of speculations, you know that this was an effort to get rid of Kennedy and put Johnson in, and a lot of other things. So he immediately called on Waggoner Carr who was attorney general of Texas. Waggoner Carr, follwing President Kennedy's funeral, appeared on all the networks and made an announcement to that effect. (9)
Abe [Fortas] has talked with Katzenbach and Katzenbach has talked with the Attorney General. They recommend a seven man commission--two Senators, two Congressmen, the Chief Justice, Allen Dulles, and a retired military man (general or admiral). Katzenbach is preparing a description of how the Commission would function***. (10)
I doubted that anybody in the Government, Mr. Hoover or the FBI or myself or the President or anyone else, could satisfy a lot of foreign opinion that all facts were being revealed and that the investigation would be complete and conclusive and without any loose ends.
So, from the beginning, I felt that some kind of commission would be desirable for that purpose***that it would be desirable *** for the President to appoint some commission of people who had international and domestic public stature and reputation for integrity that would review all of the investigations and direct any further investigation. (11)
When this country is confronted with threatening divisions and suspicions, I said, and its foundation is being ricked, and the President of the United States says that you are the only man who can handle the matter, you won't say "no" will you? (15)
***about 3:30 that same afternoon I received a call from the White House asking if I could come to see the President and saying that it was quite urgent. I, of course, said I would do so and very soon therafter I went to his office. I was ushered in and, with only the two of us in the room, he told me of his proposal. He said he was concerned about the wild stories and rumors that were arousing not only our own people but people in other parts of the world. He said that because Oswald had been murdered, there could be no trial emanating from the assassination of President Kennedy, and that unless the facts were explored objectively and conclusions reached that would be respected by the public, it would always remain an open wound with ominous potential. He added that several congressional committees and Texas local and State authorities were contemplating public investigations with television coverage which would compete with each other for public attention, and in the end leave the people more bewildered and emotional than at present. He said he was satisfied that if he appointed a bipartisan Presidential Commission to investigate that facts impartially and report them to a troubled Nation that the people would accept its findings. He told me that he had made up his mind as to the other members, that he has communicated with them, and that they would serve if I would accept the chairmanship. He then named them to me. I then told the President my reasons for not being available for the chairmanship. He replied, "You were a soldier in World War I, but there was nothing you could do in that uniform comparable to what you can do for your country in this hour of trouble." He then told me how serious were the rumors floating around the world. The gravity of the situation was such that it might lead us into war, he said, and, if so, it might be a nuclear war. He went on to tell me that he had just talked to Defense Secretary Robert McNamara, who had advised him that the first nuclear strike against us might cause the loss of 40 million people.
I then said, "Mr. President, if the situation is that serious, my personal views do not count. I will do it." He thanked me, and I left the White House. (16)
I believe that Chief Justice Warren accepted the assignment from President Johnson for precisely the same reason that the other six of us did. We ere asked by the President to undertake this responsibilty, as a public duty and service, and despite the reluctance of all of us to add to our then burden or operations we accepted, and I am sure that was the personal reaction and feeling of the Chief Justice. (18)
I came on to Houston, and then I began to get calls from Katzenbach and from Abe Fortas telling me that they were having a Presidential Commission appointed to go into this matter. This would be to keep Congress from setting up a bunch of committees and going in and maybe having a McCarthy hearing or something like that. The next thing I knew they were telling me, "Leon, you've got to come up here." This was Katzenbach and Fortas both. "Because the Chief (Chief Justice Warren, who had accepted the appointment from the President) doesn't want any part of the court of inquiry in Texas. And I said, "Well, as far as I can see it, there's no need in our doing anything that conflicts-- let's work together." He said, "Well, he doesn't want any part of Waggoner Carr, the attorney general down there, because he said it would just be a political matter." He said, "He respects you and so*** In and event I then went up to Washington, and I had the problem of working this matter out. I must say that Deputy Attorney General Katzenbach was a great help; Solicitor General Archie Cox was of great help. Those two promarily and Waggoner Carr and I worked with them--Katzenbach saw the Chief Justice from time to time, bringing proposals to him from me; the Chief Justice was willing to talk to me without Carr present--I could'nt do that. It finally evolved that--from all these discussions, there finally evolved a solution that we would all meet. We did meet in the Chief's office, and the Chief addressed all his remarks to me and ignored Waggoner Carr, but I would in turn talk to Carr in his presense and direct the question to him and so on. What we did is agree that we would not begin and court inquiry, but that we would be invited into hearings; would have full access to everything. (21)
When we got through with that, I called Walter Jenkins and told him that we thought we had solved it properly, and that I ought to have a word with the President. He said, "By all means. The President is waiting to hear from you."*** I went on over there and he was in the pool; he came immediately to the edge of the pool and shook hands with me. Then I told him what had happened, and that we had worked it out and had worked it out in great shape, and we were going to work together, and everybody was happy and shook hands and patted each other on the back and so on. And that even the Chief Justice had warmed up to Waggoner Carr before the conference broke up. Then Lyndon Johnson looked at me and he said, "Now, Leon, you've done several things for me--many things in fact for me. Now, it's my time to do something for you." I said, Mr. President, there is nothing I want. I don't want you to do anything for me." And so he looked at me and he said, "All right, I'll just send you a Christmas card then." (22)
PURPOSE OF THE WARREN COMMISSION
To examine the evidence developed by the Federal Bureau of Investigation and any additional evidence that may hereafter come to light or be uncovered by Federal or State authorities; to make such further investigation as the Commission finds desirable; to evaluate all the facts and circumstances surrounding such assassination, including the subsequent violent death of the man charged with the assassination, and to report to me its findings and conclusions.
Now, with Oswald dead, even a wounded Governor could not quell the doubts. In addition, we were aware of stories that Castro, still smarting over the Bay of Pigs and only lately accusing us of sending CIA agents into the country to assassinate him, was the perpetrator of the Oswald assassination plot. These rumors were another compelling reason that a thorough study had to be made of the Dallas tragedy at once. Out of the Nation's suspicions, out of the Nation's need for facts, the Warren Commission was born. [Italic added](26)
He (Warren) placed emphasis on the importance of quenching rumors, and precluding further speculation such as that which has surrounded the death of Lincoln. He emphasized that the Commission had to determine the truth, whatever that might be. (27)
The Moscow radio said Oswald was charged with Mr. Kennedy's slaying after 10 hours of interrogation, but there was no evidence which could prove this accusation.
All the circumstances of President Kennedy's tragic death allow one to assume that this murder was planned and carried out by the ultrarightwing, fascist, and racist circles, by those who carried out by those who cannot stomach any step aimed at the easing of international tensions, and the improvement of Soviet-American relations. (29)
The full story of the assassination and its stunning sequel must be placed before the American people and the world in a responsible way by a responsible source of the U.S. Government *** The killing of the accused assassin does not close the books on the case. In fact, it raises questions which must be answered if we are ever to fathom the depths of the President's terrible death and its aftermath. An objective Federal commission, if necessary, with Members of Congress included, must be appraised of all and tell us all. Much as we would like to obliterate from memory the most disgraceful weekend in our history, a clear explanation must be forthcoming. Not in a spirit of vengeance, not to cover up, but for the sake of information and justice to restore respect for law. (30)
President Lyndon Johnson has widely recognized that energetic steps must be taken to prevent a repetition of the dreadful era of rumor and gossip that followed the assassination of President Abraham Lincoln. A century has hardly sufficed to quiet the doubts that arose in the wake of that tragedy. (31)
His [Warren's] idea was that the principal function of the Warren Commission was to allay doubts if possible. You know, possible in the sense of being honest. (34)
Staff counsel Arlen Specter described his reaction to Warren's concern about rumors by stating:
*** that was a matter in our minds but we did not tailor our findings to accommodate any interest other than the truth. (35)
Staff consel Norman Redlich believed that the objective of allaying public fears was "a byproduct of the principal objective which was to discover all the facts."(36)
I think that it is fair to say, and certainly reflects my feeling, and it was certainly the feeling that I had of all my collegues that we were determined, if we could find something that showed that there had been sommething sinister beyond what appeared to have gone on.*** (37)
Slawson stated:
I think it is hard to remember 13 years ago what the timing of all these things was but among the staff members themselves, like when I talked to Jem Liebeler and Dave Belin and Bert Griffin particularly we would sometimes speculate at to what would happen if we got firm evidence that pointed to some very high official. It sounds perhaps silly in retrospect to say it but there was even rumors at the time, of course, that President Johnson was involved. Of course, that would present a kind of frightening prospect, because if the President or anyone that high up was indeed involved, they clearly were not going to allow someone like us to bring out the truth if they could stop us. The gist of it was that no one questioned the fact that we would still have to bring it out and would do our best to bring out just whatever the truth was. The only question in our mind was if we came upon such evidence that was at all credible how would we be able to protect it an bring it to the proper authorities? (38)
I think because Earl Warren adamant almost that the Commission would make up its mind on what it thought was the truth and then they would state it as much without qualification as they could. He wanted to lay at rest, doubts. He made no secret of this on the staff. It was consistent with his philosophy as a judge. (39)
Slawson also stated:
I suppose he did not think that an official document like this ought to read at all, tentatively, it should not be a source of public speculation if he could possibly avoid it. (40)
I think also part of the problem was, as I said before, a tendency, at least in the galleys of chapter IV, to try and downplay or not give equal emphasis to contrary evidence and just simply admit and state openly that there is a conflict in the testimony and the evidence the Commission could conclude whatever the Commission could conclude. (41)
Liebeler also stated:
Once you conclude on the basis of evidence we had that Oswald was the assassin, for example, taking that issue first, then obviously it is in the interest of the Commission, and I presume everyone else, to express that conclusion in a straightforward and convincing way.*** (42)
There was a recommendation, as I recall, from the staff that could be summarized this way. No. 1, Lee Harvey Oswald was the assassin. No.2, the Commission has found no evidence of a conspiracy, foreign or domestic.
The second point is quite different from the language which was recommended by the staff. I think the Commission was right to make that revision and I stand by it today. (43)
Insofar as the conspiracy issue is concerned, there hs been so much talk about that. I don't think I need to dwell on it any longer. I no longer feel we had no credible evidence or reliable evidence in regard to a conspiracy, but I rather think the weight of evidence was against the existence of a conspiracy (44)
The one factor that I did not examine with regard to the staff as much as I would from my having had this experience was their ability to write and most of them had demonstrated a considerable ability to write and most of them had demonstrated a considerable ability to write in Law Review or other legal materials by their record but my experience taught me that some people are fluent in writing and others while they are skilled at it have great difficulty in getting started and finishing and getting the job completed. I don't know just how I would have tried to have anticapated that problem and worked it out but it became a serious difficulty for me in my work as general counsel. Looking back on it I would have much preferred that I had not only all the skills that I did in the staff but the additional one that as soon as we had completed the investigation they would go right to work and write a fine piece in which they described their activities and the results. (45)
Now I think our job here is essentially one for the evaluation of evidence as distinguished from being one of gathering evidence, and I believe at the outset at least we can start with the premise that we can rely upon the reports of the various agencies that have been engaged in investigation of the matter, the FBI, the Secret Service, and others that I may know about at the present time. (46)
ORGANIZATION OF THE WARREN COMMISSION
After my appointment to the Commission, and following several of the Commission's organizational meetings, I was disturbed that the chairman, in selecting a general counsel for the staff, appeared to be moving in the direction of a one-man commission. My views were shared by several other members of the Commission.
The problem was resolved by an agreement that all top staff appointments would be approved by the Commission as a whole. (47)
I believe the rationale is readily stated. In order to begin and undertake a project of this dimension, there has to be some arbitrary allocation of responsibilities. There is no way to do it that eliminates overlap or possible confusion but this was an effort to try to organize the work in such a way that assignments would be reasonable clear, overlaps could be readily identified, and coordination would would be accomplished among the various members of the staff. (48)
GRIFFIN. As far as I was concerned, I did not feel that it operated in a way I felt comfortable.
I would prefer not to ascribe reasons but simply to say some of the senior counsel did not participate as extensively as some of the junior counsel. (52)
He added:
It is more accurate to say I ended up as the only counsel in my area. (53)
A few did not. The majority of them did--and I think contributed very valuably. They did not, with a couple of exceptions, spend as much time as the younger men did, especially as the investigation wore on. Some of them, I understand, were hired with the promise that turned out not to be the case. (54)
I think in the roughest terms this gives a fair picture of the days spent during the period by members of the staff. I think that with reference to my earlier comment you should note that several of the senior counsel felt that their primary responsibility was to work in the investigative stages of the Commission's work. (55)
A third reason was, however, that Hubert was disenchanted with some of the things that were going on in that he didn't feel he was getting the kind of support that he wanted to get, and he expressed to me a certain amount of demoralization over what he felt was unresponsiveness that existed between himself and particulary Mr. Rankin. (56)
Any time someone is not able to spend full time it had that effect. It means that that work which might have been done during the course of that full-time work gets picked up by others *** I don't think on balance any of that had a permanent harmful effect because I believe that the entire staff taken as a whole, managed to conduct what I consider to be a thorough inquiry. Obviously, as anyone who has conducted an investigation knows, you always would like to have everyone there all the time. That was not possible during a substanntial portion of the Warren investigation. (57)
As I said before, I felt overworked and I think many of the staff members felt the same way. I think the main problem was one of the great underestimation of the size of the task at the time. As I said, we were told, we were telephoned and asked to come in; it would be 3 to 6 months. It is my recollection they said it would be only 3 to 6 months on the outside and of course we ended up taking about 8. There was a reluctance, once we were there, to admit--again this is a matter of once you have made a decision you don't like to admit you were wrong--but people did not like to admit that we probably needed more help and more time. (58)
I don't think it did although it would have been helpful if my senior counsel, Francis Adams, had an oppurtunity to participate more extensively. (59)
There is one member that you can see that did not attend hardly at all and I certainly should have gotten rid of him really.*** That was Francis Adams and he really didn't contribute anything. (60)
My recollection is that during the early part of the Commission's work that Mr. Jenner was concerned, I believe he was interested in becoming president of the American Bar Association and I believe he spent some time on that issue. (61)
It was difficult for Mr. Jenner and me to work out a general relationship on that question at that time. Since I was a so-called junior staff member at that time, Mr. Jenner was not, I was quite unsure when I started as to how to handle the problem. I finally just decided to do my own thing and basically went ahead and did most of that original work, myself. Mr. Jenner and I never actually worked very closely together. He worked on projects and I worked on projects. (62)
INDEPENDENT INVESTIGATORS
Well, I gave some thought to that and I finally conluded that I would lose more than I would gain, that the whole intelligence community in the Government would feel that the Commission was indicating a lack of confidence in them and that from then on I would not have any cooperation from them; they would universally be against the Commission and try to trip us up. (63)
***was a decision of the Commission, although I recommended that kind of a procedure because I described various possibilities of getting outside investigators and that it might take a long period of time to accumulate them, find out what their expertise was, and whether they could qualify to handle sensitive information in the Government, and it might be a very long time before we could even get a staff going that could work on the matter, let alone have any progress on it. (64)
We had special people assigned from CIA, FBI, and Secret Service who were with us more or less full time, especially the Secret Service who were investigators. (65)
I think that some of the areas of investigation such as that headed by Dave Belin, which was the immediate circumstances of the shooting in Dallas, employed private investigators at various points to cross-check and give an independent evaluation. (66)
My recollection is that in ballistics I believe we used someone from the government of Illinois, either handwriting or fingerprinting. I am not sure it was not someone from the New York City Police Department. (67)
If [in] organizational structure you include the personnel available, I think that everyone would have much preferred to have had a totally independent investigative arm to carry out the investigative functions of the Commission, but I believe the Commission concluded early on, and I was not privy to any such position from my position as assistant counsel, that it would be impractical to organize an entire investigative staff from the start so that use was made of existing Federal investigative facilities***there would be an observation [among the staff] from time to time how nice it would be if we had a totally independent staff. (68)
I have no clear recollection of that. Certainly during the time of the investigation from time to time staff members talked to Mr. Rankin about what it might have been like if we had had a completely independent staff. I think that we reached the conclusion then, with which I still agree, that while using the existing investigatory arms of the United States had certain disadvantages, on balance it was still the right decision to make. There were certain tradeoffs *** I don't think there was any happy, completely happy solution to that dilemma. (69)
***it is not true we didn't have our own investigative possibilities. There was a very distinguished group of litigating lawyers [on staff] that we called on *** We had a very impressive list and they did great work. So it is not true we relied entirely on the agencies of the Goverment. (70)
It is my best judgment that the procedure and the policy the Warren Commission followed was the correct one and I would advocate any subsequent Commission to follow the same.
For the Warren Commission to have gathered together an experienced [investigative] staff, to get them qualified to handle classified information, to establish the organization that would be necessary for a sizable number of investigators, would have been time-consuming and in my opinion would not have answered what we were mandated to do.
It is my, it is my strong feelings that what we did was the right way. We were not captives of, but we utilized the information from the in-house agencies of the Federal Government***. (71)
The FBI, and I use that as an example, undertook a very extensive investigation. I don't recall how many agents but they had a massive operation to investigate everything. The Commission with this group of 14 lawyers and some staff people, then drew upon all of this information which was available, and we, if my memory serves me accurately, insisted that the FBI give us everything they had. Now that is a comprehensive order from the Commission to the Director and to the FBI. I assume, and I think the Commission assumed, that that order was so broad that if they had anything it was their obligation to submit it. Now if they didn't, that is a failure on the part of the agencies, not on the part of the Commission. (72)
***there was a concern that this investigation not be conducted in such a way as to destroy any of the investigative agencies that then existed in the Government. There was a genuine fear expressed that this could be done. Second, it was important to keep the confidence of the existing investigative agencies, and that if we had a staff that was conducting its own investigation, that it would generate a paranoia in the FBI and the other investigative agencies which would not only perhaps be politically disadvantageous, it would be bad for the country because it might not be justified but it might also be counterproductive. I think there was a fear that we might be undermining *** My impression is that there was genuine discussion of this at a higher level than mine. (73)
COMMUNICATION AMONG THE STAFF
One way of dealing with the separate areas within which the lawyers were dealing was to make certain that all the materials that came in the office were reviewed in one central place and that any material that bore even remotely or potentially on an area. It was frequently the case that materials in our possession were sent to three or four areas so that each of the groups of lawyers could look at the same material from that group's perspective and decide whether it had any relevance in the part of the investigation for which those lawyers were reponsible. I continued this function throughout the Commission and always erred on the side of multiple duplication so as to make certain that the members of the staff in a particular area did get the papers which I thought they needed. Another way of coordinating among the staff was by the circulation of summary memoranda, which happened on a regular basis throughout the Commission's work *** The third way of coordinating among the staff was perhaps more informal and related primarily to the ease with which the members of the staff could get together to discuss a problem in which more than one area had particular interest. (75)
We had very few staff meetings of a formal nature. We did have two or three, maybe four or five. The bulk of the communication was on a person-to-person ad hoc basis. There were some memos, I believe, passed back and forth. (76)
He expressed some dissatisfaction with the communication he and Hubert had with Rankin:
I suppose that it would not be fair to say that we did not have direct access to Rankin. I cannot say at any point when we tried to see Rankin that we couldn't see him. I don't recall any situation where we were formally required to go through someone else to get there. There was no doorkeeper in a certain sense. All of those communications that were in writing that went to Rankin went through Howard Willens, but as a practical matter, and I am not sure entirely what the reasons are, Hubert and I did not have a lot of communication with Rankin. We really communicated with him personally infrequently. We had certain amount of communication at the beginning. I do remember at the outset Hubert and I had a meeting with Rankin in which we discussed the work of the mission that we had, but I would say that by the first of April we had relatively little communication with Rankin. That is, we might not speak to Rankin maybe more that once every 2 weeks. Mr. Rankin is a formal person. Hubert and I did not feel comfortable in our relationship with him. I point this out because I think our relationship with Rankin was different than some of the other staff members. I think a number of them would genuinely say, and I would believe from what I saw, that they certainly had much better communication than we did. Whether they would regard it as satisfactory I don't know. (77)
There was a very informal atmosphere on the staff so that there was constant contact among all the lawyers both during the working day and those of us who were around the evenings. We would customarily have dinner together, the virtual sole topic of conversation was what each of us was doing. So there was a very extensive exchange albeit principally informal among members of the staff as to what each was doing. (78)
INTERACTION BETWEEN THE WARREN COMMISSION AND THE STAFF
A part from those occasional meetings with the Chief Justice most of the staff's dealings with the members of the Commission occurred on a sporadic and limited basis. (79)
However, in terms of informal relationship between the staff and the Commission in the sense of the staff being present at the Commission meetings in a formal way, that did not exist. I was not present at any meeting of the commission. I was not privy to any formal meetings of the commission. Mr Rankin was the official line of communication between the Commission and the staff. (80)
I had almost a total lack on contact with the Commission members. I have some thoughts in retrospect now about some of the perceptions, total conjecture but based on other things that have happened, but at the time I did feel senator Russell was genuinely concerned about conducting the investigation. (81)
I believe that perhaps some members of the staff would have preferred to have had a more direct ongoing formal relationship with the Commission. (82)
Allen Dulles and I became fairly close I think. He had aged quite a bit by the time he was on the Warren Commission and was also sick. I have forgotten, he had some kind of disease that made one of his legs and foot very painful. So he was not effective sometimes but when he was he was very smart and I liked him very much. Because of my particular assignment of course he spent a lot of time with me. We talked informally quite a bit. (84)
I think some of them were tremendously well informed. the Chief Justice was extremely well informed. I believe that former President Ford was extremely well informed. Mr. Dulles attended a great many hearings. I believe that on the broad areas of the Commission's inquiry the Commission was informed. They were obviously not as informed of some of the specific enormous factual data in connection with the assassination as was the staff. I have never known a staff that thought that group that it worked for was as well informed as the staff was, and the Warren Commission was no exception. (86)
What I had intended to convey to Mr. Epstein (the author of a book on the Commission) was the idea that in terms of developing the investigation, the direction in particular of the investigation, and in drafting the report, the Commissioners themselves were not directly involved, and they were not. (87)
***the Commission made a decision as to what would be done which was not always in accordance with my own personal view as to what should be done, for example, the review of the X-rays and photographs of the assassination of President Kennedy. I thought that they should have been observed by the Commission and by me among others perhaps having responsibility for that area and I said so at the time. (89)
I think we were a little lax in the Commission in connection with the use of those X-rays. I was rather critical of Justice Warren at that time. I thought he was a little too sensitive of the sensibilities of the family. He didn't want to have put into the record some of the photographs and some of the X-rays there. (90)
Although it is not necessary to any essential findings of the Commission to determine just which shot hit Governor Connally, there is very persuasive evidence from the experts to indicate that the same bullet which pierced the President's throat also caused Governor Connally's wounds. However, Governor Connally's testimony and certain other factors have given rise to some difference of opinion as to this probability but there is no question in the mind of any member of the Commission that all the shots which caused the President's and Governer Connally's wound were fired from the sixth-floor window of the Texas School Book Depository. (91)
We did have disagreements at times in the Commission and, I as I recall, I think the chief debate grew out of the fact or the question as to whether there were two shots or three shots or whether the same shot that entered President Kennedy's neck penetrated the body of Governor Connally.
I must say, to be very honest about it, that I held in my mind during the life of the Commission that there had been three shots and that a separate shot struck Governer Connally. (92)
PRESSURES
*** The attitude with respect to time perhaps should be viewed in November of 1977 as being somewhat different from 1964 to the extent that the Commission was interested in a prompt conclusion of its work. It did not seek to sacrifice completeness for promptness. When the Commission started its job there was no conclusion date picked. My recollection is that it was discussed in terms of perhaps as little as 3 months, perhaps as much as 6 months. As we moved along in the investigation there were comments on attitudes that we should be moving along, we should get the investigation concluded, so that the scope of what we sought to do and the time in which we sought to do it had as its backdrop an obvious attitude by the Commission that it wanted to conclude the investigation at the earliest possible date. (93)
It is hard to specify the people or Commissioners who were pushing for a prompt conclusion, but that was an unmistakable aspect of the atmosphere of the Commission's work. (94)
I think the time was sufficient to do the work of the Warren Commission. I cannot deny that the work could have gone on for another month or two or six. (95)
***although at times I was afraid there wouldn't be. There was time pressure on all of us. I think that all members of the staff were bothered and somewhat resented the fact that we were pushed to work at such a rapid pace, but we resisted any attempts to make us finish before we felt we were ready to be finished. When the report came out neither I, and I don't think anybody else, felt that there was anything significant that we had not been able to do in the time.*** But the amount of paper that we had to go through to do our job well was tremendous *** I had so many documents to get through and try to understand and try to put together. They continued pouring in from the ongoing investigation after that. There weren't that many of us. So we had more than enough to do, I would say. (97)
I took, and I think everyone else did, as much care as we could. But the time pressure was severe. With the mass of material that we had I am sure that errors of numbering, and perhaps what footnote A should have had, footnote B did, and vice versa, occurred. I don't think that the kind of crosschecking that normally goes into a good professional publication, for example, ever went into this (98)
*** But Hubert and I, we had a completely, we had a scope of investigation that was as great as all the other people put together, because we were investigating a different murder. We had two people who were investigating a conspiracy from one man's point of view and we had a security question, how did he get into the basement, and so forth. (99)
Well, we had pressures from the beginning of the time element because the country was anxious to know what had happened and whether there was any conspiracy involved. I was assured by the Chief Justice that it would only take me 2 or 3 months at the outside in this job and that is all the time I would be away from my law practice, and properly, but also to get back to my other work and, on the other hand, the first meeting we had with the staff, I told them that our only client was the truth and that was what we must search for and try to reveal, and I think we adhered to that, that we never departed from that standard, any of the Commission or myself or the staff. (100)
I didn't think there was any pressure. There was an expression by some members of the Coommission that it would be better if the problem of the assassination and whether any conspiracy was involved and what had happened, who the assassin was, as the Commission found, all of those questions were not injected into the various political conventions, but there was no indication at any time that we should try to get it out for any such purpose and not adequately make a report or investigate whatever sources we were able to find. (101)
We had no rush to judgment. We came to a judgment. There were some questions of style in regard to the preparation of the report that I would like to have had *** another crack at to make it a little more clear *** I had a feeling at the end we were rushing a little bit the last few days to get to print rather than to arrive at any conclusions. We had already arrived at the conclusions. (102)
Q. You never did feel a deadline pressure so that you hurried your work?
WARREN. This wasn't an election year that we did this, was it? This was in 1963.
The White House never gave us an instruction, never, never even looked at out work until I took it up to the President. Never commented---
His [Warren's] main motivation in wanting the work done, and which he repeated several times to different members of the staff, was that he wanted the truth known and stated to the public before the Presidential election of 1964 because he didn't want the assassination in any way to affect the elections. I am not sure at all how he thought it would, but he didn't want any possibility of it. That was his principal reason for having it finished. (106)
It was also indicated at the outset that the hope was that the report would be completed prior to the Democratic National Convention, that essentially had been indicated by the White House, that it was the President's feeling. (107)
Let me say it was never communicated to us that it was the Commission that wanted to curtail things. There were two communications that were made as to where this pressure was coming from. The most prominent one was the White House, that there was a general, unspecified reference to the fact that the White House wanted this report out before the convention. That was said to us many, many times. I think the convention was in June. (108)
Griffen also indicated another deadline developed during the course of the Warren Commission:
Second, just by way of human interest, color, perhaps another date began to be set because the Chief Justice had a trip scheduled to go to Europe and the hope was that it could be completed before he went on his trip to Europe.(109)
In part the concern was media concern. There were numerous conversations with media representatives who were apprehensive about being scooped by the report being published at a time when their facilities were being allocated to covering some other major political event. That obviously was not a decisive concern but it was something that was brought to the attention of the Commission and various other officials as the Commission's report seemed to be working toward its conclusion. The concern about the election may be difficult to understand now. At the time there were ugly rumors and apprehensions regarding the work of the Commission and the nature of the conspiracy that may have occured to have caused the assassination of President Kennedy. It was feared, perhaps without justification, that the report might become a campaign issue if it had not been published in advance of the election***. the other concern was that if it were postponed until after the election it would be assumed it had been repressed so as to avoid disclosures that might affect the candidacy of the President. (110)
I felt then, and I still feel, despite a lot of misgivings that I had, that the purpose was genuine purpose, to find the truth behind the assassination. I do think, however, that there were major political considerations that dictated how this work was conducted. The time frame that was set initially for the work was a political consideration. This investigation was carried on during a period when everyone was vividly aware of the results of the 1950's when Senator McCarthy held a prominent position. There was a great deal of concern that we not conduct an investigation that would have overtones of what people called McCarthyism. So that a lot of decisions that were made in terms of how we proceeded I think were made against that kind of background. (111)
We were not pressured in any way by any person or by any organization. We made our own decisions, as the President had asked us to do, and as we determined to do on the basis of what we thought was right and objective. (118)
I have no recollection of that particular June 4 meeting or any pressure that the Commission received for any definitive conclusion. As other members of the Commission, I think, will testify, we had a unanimous vote as to the fact that Lee Harvey Oswald committed the assassination and all other decisions of the Commission were also unanimous.
There was no pressure. We operated as a unit of seven members who fortunately all agreed. (119)
I think there are simply a great many people who cannot accept what I believe to be the simple truth, that one rather insignificant person was able to assassinate the President of the United States. I think there are others, who for reasons that there are less pure have consciously tried to deceive. I think that since there is a residue of public sentiment that finds it very hard to accept the conclusion, that becomes a further feeling, for those who have found it in their interest, to pursue the attacks on the Commission. I do not mean to imply that all of the critics of the Commission have bad motives. I think that there is in this country, fortunately, a healthy skepticism about government.
I believe that that was certainly true during the Watergate period. The assassination is a complex fact, as you will see when you investigate it. It was not an easy thing to investigate. Jack Ruby and Lee Harvey Oswald were two people with most unusual backgrounds. They did a variety of things. That they should meet in the basement of the Dallas Police station and one shoot the other is something that does strain the imagination.
I think it is very unfortunate that the Warren Commission has been subject to the kinds of attack that it has. We did what we felt was completely honest professional and thorough task.
I have done a lot of things in my public service in my life. I regard my service on the Warren Commission as an extremely important, perhaps the most important thing that I have done, because I believe I was instrumental in putting before the American people all of the facts about the assassination of President Kennedy.
That significant numbers of Americans don't believe it remains to me a source of great disappointment. (121)
II. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE WARREN COMMISSION AND THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION AND THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
A. PERSPECTIVE OF THE WARREN COMMISSION
Attitude of the Commission members
Gentlemen, this is a very sad and solemn duty that we are undertaking, and I am sure that there is not one of us but what would rather be doing almost anything else that he can think of than to be on a commission of this kind. But it is a tremendously important one. *** Now, I think our job here is essentially one for the evaluation of evidence as distinguished from being one of gathering evidence, and I believe that at the outset at least we can rely upon the reports of the various agencies that have been engaged in investigation of the matter, the FBI, the Secret Service, and others that I may not know about at the present time. (122)
How much of their findings does the FBI propose to release to the press before we present the findings of this Commission? (126)
CHAIRMAN. No; I have not, for the simple reason that I have never been informed that the CIA had any knowledge about this.
The Chief Justice and I finally came to the conclusion, after looking at this report, that we might have to come back to you and ask for some investigative help, too, examine special situations, because we might not get all we needed by just going back to the FBI and other agencies because the report has to look for in order to get the answers that it wants and it's entitled to. We thought we might need some investigative staff. (134)
Mr. DULLES. We can expedite the CIA report, I know, because I can give them, or the FBI can pass to them these exhibits about Oswald being in Russia. This is going to be a pretty key business, the analysis of those reports.
*** perhaps we ought to have a thorough investigation *** as to the relationship between the FBI and the Secret Service and the CIA in connection, not only with this matter, but in matters of this kind so that we can do something worthwhile in the future. (140)
Mr. RANKIN. I thought first you should know about it. Second, there is this defector to that is somewhat an issue in this case, and I suppose you are all aware of it. That is that the FBI is very explicit that Oswald is the assassin or was the the assassin, and they are very explicit that there was no conspiracy, and they are also saying in the same place that they are continuing their investigation. Now in my experience of almost 9 years, in the first place it is hard to get them to say when you think you have got a case tight enough to convict somebody, that that is the person that committed the crime. In my experience with the FBI they don't do that. They claim that they don't do that. Second, they have not run out of all kinds of leads in Mexico or in Russia and so forth which they could probably *** they haven't run out all the leads on the information and they could probably say--that isn't our business. *** But they are concluding there can't be a conspiracy without those being run out. Now that is not (normal) from my experience with the FBI***. Why are they so eager to make both of those conclusions *** the original report and their experimental report, which is such a departure. Now that is just circumstantial evidence, and it doesn't prove anything about this, but it raises questions. We have to try to find out what they haven't said that would give any support to the story, and report it to you***.
*** it is the feeling of the department, not the Attorney General because he is not there, but Mr. Katzenbach, and Mr. Miller, the Assistant Attorney General in charge of the criminal division, that such a request might be embarrasing, and at least would be difficult for the Attorney General, and might, if urged while we would get the information we desired, make very much more difficult for him to carry on the work of the Department for the balance of his term. (145)
We do have a dirty rumor that is very bad for the Commission, the problem and it is very damaging to the agencies that are involved in it and it is very damaging to the agencies that are involved in it and it must be wiped out insofar as it is possible to do so***. (149)
If you get a statement from responsible officials in that agency and then you say, "Well we are not going to take this statement on face value, we are going to go behind it," this could become a matter of grave embarrassment to everybody. (154)
Senator RUSSELL. If Oswald never had assassinated the President or at least been charged with assassinating the President and had been in the employ of the FBI and somebody had gone to the FBI they would have denied he was an agent.
Mr. McCLOY. I wouldn't put much confidence in the intelligence of all the agents I have run into. I have run into some awfully stupid agents.
Mr. RANKIN. Would it be acceptable to go to Mr. Hoover and tell him about the situation and that we would like to go ahead and find out what we could***. Then if he reacts and says, "I want to show you that it couldn't be," or something like that, beforehand, what about that kind of approach?
Mr. McCLOY. What have they done? *** I would think the time is almost overdue for us being as dependent as we are on FBI investigations, the time is almost overdue for us to have a better perspective of the FBI investigation than we now have***We are so dependent upon them for our facts that it might be a useful thing to have [Allen Belmont, one of Hoover's assistants] before us, or maybe just you talk to him, for example, to follow up on Hosty.
Lee Harvey Oswald was never used by this Bureau in an informant capacity. He was never paid any money for furnishing information and he most certainly never was an informant of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. In the event you have any further questions concerning the activities of the Federal Bureau of Investigation in this case, we would appreciate being contacted directly. (162)
Attitude of the Warren Commission staff
Predisposition regarding the Agencies
Q. Had you prior to going to work for the Warren Commission had any prior experience with any of the Federal agencies, investigative agencies, FBI, CIA?
Liebeler indicated that, other than this, he had had no other contacts with the agencies prior to working for the Commission and that he had no predisposition toward them.
I had had no prior contact with the Secret Service that I can recollect, or the CIA. So I really had no predisposition. I had an open mind. (175)
With respect to their capabilities, speaking for myself, I had experience with the FBI and had found them to be able investigative personnel in my prior contacts. (176)
*** I don't think I had any predisposition other than the general public awareness of these agencies. I suppose I had a little bit more than the average person's knowledge about the CIA, very slightly. My recollection is that the CIA when I was in college recruited people, I mean they came on, they sent down people who would talk to students just like any other prospective employer. I don't know if they still do that or not. I knew one or two people in the class ahead of me who by all accounts went to work for the CIA and it was something I briefly considered myself. I decided to go on to graduate school and physics and I never explored the CIA thing. But they had seemed to hire high caliber people out of my college. I was favorably disposed there (177)
As a professor of constitutional law I regarded myself as a civil libertarian. I had regarded the FBI and its activities during the 1950's in the cold war period as being one which had been repressive of free speech. So I did not come to Washington with the view that the Federal Bureau of Investigation was a model that I should choose to follow. I had had no direct experience with it *** I had no particular feeling about the CIA. (178)
I had worked with the FBI for 2 years when I was an assistant U.S. attorney. I didn't have a political view of them but I frankly didn't think they were very competent. I felt then, and I still feel, that they have a great myth about their ability but that they are not capable by their investigative means of ever uncovering a serious and well planned conspiracy. They would stumble upon it. I think their investigative means themselves may be self-defeating. I never found them very creative, very imaginative. My attitude toward them was that I thought they were honest. I didn't think in a sticky situation that I would have great faith in them. (179)
Attitude of the staff toward the investigation
* * * I would not characterize our position as being one of extreme belief or extreme disbelief. I would call it one of healthy skepticism. (181)
We were concerned about some of the agencies from the point of view that their own activities were subjects of investigation. So that was always a matter of concern. (182)
I think that at that point my recollection of conversations, for example, with Norman Redlich, were that he took a political view of the FBI. He saw them as a conservative agency which was determined to pin this on someone who was of a different political persuasion. I think he started out with a strong motivation along that line, to prove that they were wrong. (184)
I think that it is fair to say, and certainly reflects my feeling, and it was certainly the feeling that I had of all of my colleagues, that we were determined, if we could, to prove that the FBI was wrong, to find a conspiracy if we possibly could.
I think we thought we would be national heroes in a sense if we could find something that showed that there had been something sinister beyond what appeared to have gone on. (185)
We would sometimes speculate as to what would happen if we got firm evidence that pointed to some very high official. * * * Of course that would present a kind of frightening prospect because if the President or anyone else that high up was indeed involved they clearly were not going to allow someone like us to bring out the truth if they could stop us.
The gist of it was that no one questioned the fact that we would still have to try to bring it out and would do our best to bring out just whatever the truth was. The only question in our mind was if we came upon such evidence that was at all credible how would we be able to protect it and bring it to proper authorities. (186)
When I said higher-ups I would include the people high up in the organization, the FBI and CIA too. Everybody was of course a possible suspect.(187)
* * * there was also a concern that this investigation not be conducted in such a way as to destroy any of the investigative agencies that then existed in the Government. There was a genuine fear expressed that this could be done.
Second, that it was important to keep the confidence of the existing investigative agencies, and that if we had a staff that was conducting its own investigation, that it would generate a paranoia in the FBI and other investigative agencies which would not only perhaps be politically disadvantageous, it would be bad for the country because it might be justified but it might also be counterproductive.
I think that there was a fear that we might be undermining* * * my impression is that there was genuine discussion of this at a higher level than mine. (189)
Initial staff impressions of the Agencies
Q. Is it fair to say from your perceptions that the FBI and agencies of the Government at that period were convinced that Lee Harvey Oswald was a lone assassin?
The FBI had prepared a thick file which to their mind disposed of the case, it seemed like. Although my own involvement was not nearly as much with the FBI as it was with the CIA, I nevertheless read the FBI file which was a good way of getting yourself introduced to the whole general case.
I think it appeared to me, as it did to many people on the staff to be a competent document. But it also was self-serving, and you could not read that and think that the FBI had ever made any mistakes or there was any serious possibility that they had.
So, we knew that particularly with the FBI, but I just assumed it was the case with anybody, it is human nature, that once having committed themselves on any statement about what happened, they would be defensive about it and not want to admit that they were wrong, and also that they all had a strong interest in not being blamed for not having adequately protected the President. (191)
I thought the FBI report was a grossly inadequate document. In fairness to the Bureau they apparently decided to produce something very quickly, but based upon what I feel I know and remember about the facts of the assassination, I think it was a grossly inadequate document. (192)
Attitude of staff during the course of the investigation
I thought they were good before they started. I thought they sent the very best in the course of the investigation. I thought they had some very good men. I did not deal with any of the note destroyers or allegations of that. I worked with the technicians. * * * I suspected the ones we saw on the Commission were not typical of the FBI, they were really good. (193)
I felt that it-the FBI-is a big bureaucracy and most of the people I felt within the FBI functioned like a clerk in any other big organization, and they try to do their job and they try to not get in hot water with the boss and get egg over their face, and sometimes they have a couple of bosses, we being one and somebody else being another. (194)
Once the decision was made that the investigatory arms of the Federal Government were going to be used by the Commission my overall judgment of the way that those investigatory arms performed was extremely favorable.
I believe that they were completely responsive to the requests of the Commission for investigative work. (197)
He also commented:
We came with not preconceived notion. * * * At the conclusion of the inquiry I was of the opinion that we had had the full cooperation of the agencies of the United States Government. (198)
I came with the feeling that maybe there were two FBI's. Maybe there is the FBI that works at a professional law enforcement level; that was the group I dealt with, that was the group for which I came away with a very healthy respect. Maybe there was another FBI which dealt with political matters which I had nothing to do with, and which undoubtedly accounted for my prior negative feelings about their work.
Time after time as I worked with their experts I found they were fair, cautious, and did not try to overstate the case. (199)
I was disturbed over that [the omission of FBI Special Agent James P. Hosty's name from a transcription of the contents of Oswald's notebook provided to the Commission by the FBI]. I immediately reported it to Mr. Rankin * * * We wrote to the FBI a rather strong letter expressing our dismay about the fact that the transcript was not complete and asking an explanation for it * * * On the same day we sent the letter to the FBI there then came to us an explanation saying that the reason they had not sent it was that they were sending us only the material that would be addressed to leads and their own agency would not be a lead * * * In any event the explanation still left me annoyed over the fact that it had been left out and I remain annoyed to this day.
Some members of the staff thought that the significance of this omission was not particularly great and that no further action should be taken at this time. Most of the members of the staff, however, thought that the omission of the Hosty information was of considerable importance and could not be ignored by the Commission. There was discussion as to the possibility of the adverse effect on the relationship with the FBI if this matter were brought to its attention. The thought was expressed that pointing this omission out to the FBI might in fact produce more accurate reports by the FBI in the future. I suggested that the group consider the possibility of addressing a letter to the FBI which would request an explanation from the Bureau regarding this matter. The majority of the members of the staff present at the meeting did agree with the proposal that something of this sort be done in the near future. At the end of the meeting Mr. Rankin suggested that the members of the staff consider all the facts of this problem more fully. (201)
GRIFFIN. I recall the Hosty incident * * *
Q. How would you characterize the Commission's relations with the Federal Bureau of Investigation?:
It was a time then I am sure all the Commissioners and I certainly believed that Mr. Hoover would not do that unless it was the truth and all of the things that have come out in these later years about Mr. Hoover and the Bureau and various personnel had not been made known to me or the public or the Commissioners so it is quite different looking at it from this day than from then. (204)
I think there is considerable significance. In the first place, Hosty was doing quite a bit of work on the inquiries that the Commission made and if we had known that he had destroyed any kind of materials relating to the investigation or his activities we would not have allowed him to do anything more that we knew of in connection with work for the Commission. There is an implication from that note and its destruction that there might have been more to it and that the Bureau was unwilling to investigate whatever more there was and never would get the information to us. Now that is just a guess. There is, of course, not credible proof and so we really don't know how much more there was to the incident and especially what could have been found out about it if it had been examined closely upon the event. (206)
Q. After working with the CIA your initial impression remains substantially the same, you thought you could trust them and rely on them?
Slawson testified that, if anything, Rocca was overzealous in trying to be helpful:
The only drawback I can think of--not really a drawback I suppose for someone in CIA--is that he was a little overly suspicious. He obviously disliked Castro immensely. He was very emotional on the subject. (208)
He--Rocca--drew to my attention the fact that the publishing time of this particular book appears to have been almost exactly when Castro was supposed to have made his remark in the Cuban Embassy in Brazil * * * to the effect that "Two can play at this game." (210)
My only recollection at this time is that Rocca was drawing my attention to the fact that Castro might well have been involved. Of course he had presumably drawn my attention to this before but he was just doing what he did with me a lot, trying to work with me to put two and two together. (211)
My best recollection at this time is that I did in several conversations with Rocca discuss the CIA involvement in anti-Cuban activities. I was presumably told that they had been involved of course in the Bay of Pigs invasion. I remember discussing informally that involvement with a CIA operative in Mexico City. Also their involvement with anti-Castro Cuban groups in the United States. (212)
My theory was that perhaps, one, the anti-Castro Cubans we knew were very angry with Kennedy because they felt they had been betrayed with the Bay of Pigs. Oswald on the other hand was identified publicly with Castro, he was pro-Castro. So, we felt that if somehow the anti-Castro Cubans could have got Oswald to do it or done it themselves but framed Oswald, either way, somehow put the blame on Oswald that they would achieve two objectives that they presumably wanted. One was revenge on Kennedy and the second would be to trigger American public opinion strongly against Castro and possibly cause an invasion of Cuba and overthrow of Castro, and of course these people would be able to go back to their homes in cuba and not have to live under the Castro government. As I say, this made a lot of sense to me and I think it was a hypothesis held in mind for quite a while to see if the facts would fit it. Ultimately they didn't. (214)
No. In a sense everything I tried to take into consideration, so everything was a cause for questioning. But in terms of coming to a conclusion in my own mind about the reliability of the information supplied us, no, I concluded that Rocca's strong anti-Castro feeling did not bias or did not prevent him from being an honest investigator. I think he was and I am still convinced that he was. On the other hand of course it affected his judgment. (215)
No. I don't think that I entertained very long the possibility that Rocca or anybody else I had known in the CIA was involved in anyway in killing Kennedy * * *. The possibility that the anti-Castro Cubans contained people who were ruthless or desperate enough to kill Kennedy in order to serve their own end I felt was a very real one. Apparently from all I knew they contained a lot of desperate ruthless people. I did not have that feeling about the CIA. Now I tried to keep an open mind so that any place I came upon evidence that would point toward somebody I would investigate it and that included the CIA as a possible nest of assassins. My judgment of their character and so forth was far different I think from the judgment I made of the anti-Castro Cuban conspiracy groups in the United States. (216)
Dependence on the agencies: staff views
There is really no way I can imagine and certainly there is no way at the time I could imagine that anyone could carry on an investigation of foreign intelligence operations other than through the CIA. That simply is the body of expert opinion on that sort of thing and capability that exists in the United States. So, if a major suspect is the CIA itself * * * an investigation like the Warren commission would find it very, very difficult to ascertain that. That is just inevitable. This I think occurred to me at the time, too, but there wasn't much that could be done about it. (219)
We would talk about how we might escape from the dependency * * * . One was occasionally hiring an outside expert to give an independent evaluation or assessment or something * * * . Second was cross-checking the papers passed back and forth between jurisdictions. The third would be just keeping an eye and ear out for any odd bits of information that would come in not through the agencies. (220)
I never had the feeling that we relied on the Government agencies for our information. when we started with a bunch of FBI files, but we reviewed those so that we could conduct our own investigation. We did take the testimony of many, many witnesses. We had the reports of the examination of the physical evidence verified by outside sources, we did not rely on the FBI. So as to the basic facts of what happened in Dallas on that day not only did we not rely on the FBI work but the fact is that the Commission came to assume somewhat different conclusions that the FBI came to.
There was a preliminary FBI report that solved the problem as to what happened. Our conclusions were somewhat different from that. I don't think we relied on the FBI to the extent that people think we did. (221)
The majority of reports that were being sent to the Warren Commission, after probably the middle of the summer, 1964, was rather innocuous reports of miscellaneous allegations and so on that were continuing to come in. (223)
B. ATTITUDE OF THE FBI AND THE CIA TOWARD THE WARREN COMMISSION
General attitude
The FBI
Hoover did not want the Warren commission to conduct an exhaustive investigation for fear that it would discover important and relevant facts that we in the FBI had not discovered in our investigation, therefore, it would be greatly embarrassing to him and damaging to his career and the FBI as a whole. (228)
* * * Our President (Gerald R. Ford) was one of our (FBI) members of the Congressional stable when he was in Congress. It is to him and others we would go when we want favors handled, and, of course, we were always willing to reciprocate. All right, he became a member of the Warren Commission and he was "our man" on the Warren Commission and it was to him that we looked to protect our interest and keep us fully advised of any development that we would not like, that mitigated against us, and he did. All this I know. (229)
The main action * * * was to leak to the press the FBI investigation believing that this would tend to satisfy everybody and perhaps the authorities would conclude that an investigation of great depth and scope would not be necessary. (231)
* * * this then is how the FBI reacts to this allegation before the Commission began investigating it. Hoover covered himself by starting an "investigation" of the reports that Oswald had been an FBI informant, attempting to discredit the sources, and he made it clear to the Commission that he would prefer, thank you, to be approached directly in the unlikely event that any question remained. (232)
I could only give you my reaction when I was called into his office after I returned from Dallas and what he told me that time. There was certainly no criticism. I was told that the Warren Commission had been established. I was the liaison representative, and he wanted full and complete cooperation with them and no information whatsoever withheld from them. Give them everything. (233)
Strictly a business relationship. No friendliness, no unfriendliness. Just strictly, you have your work to do, we have ours. If we want something from you, we will call you and ask for it. If we want further explanations, we will get them from you. There was never any animosity shown, that I am aware of. (234)
No knowledge of what Mr. Sullivan was talking about when he says the Director was opposed to the creation (of the Commission) and so on * * *. And I never personally heard him object to the Warren Commission in any way, shape, or form. (235)
The Bureau by letter to the Commission indicated that the facts did not warrant placing a stop on (Oswald's) passport as our investigation disclosed no evidence that Oswald was acting under the instructions or on behalf of any foreign government or instrumentality thereof. Inspector feels it was proper at that time to take this "public" position. However, it is felt that with Oswald's background we should have had a stop on his passport, particularly since we did not know definitely whether or not he had any intelligence assignments at that time. (241)
This is the kind of thing you get from Belmont to Tolson, Hoover, knowing Hoover's opposition to the Commission, not really wanting to have anything to do with it and also thinking it fairly funny having me sitting over there and not knowing what was going on.
The reason I wanted the Bureau there was I wanted somebody telling me what was going on. I did not know. (242)
Nobody else knew. I did not know what was going on. nobody in the Government knew what was going on other than very short conclusionary statements which you got from liaison people, from the director himself.
I did not know who they were interviewing or why they were interviewing, what they uncovered. (243)
I would have thought they would have no particular problems in running down a lot of alleys they had not run down if it did not develop any information that was flatly contrary to their conclusions. (244)
The former Attorney General stated, however, that had the FBI come across evidence that clearly contradicted its official conclusions about President Kennedy's murder, he would not be completely sure what would have happened to such evidence:
What would have happened if they came across that kind of information, God only knows. What the reverberations of that talking about minor embarrassment--in really uncovering something that would have changed some result they had reported, God only knows.
I think people's heads would have rolled and they would have swallowed hard and done it. I think my view at the time would have been that in a matter as important as the assassination of a President, I think the Bureau would have swallowed and taken it and found some graceful way out. Explaining why they had come to the wrong conclusion would have been a fairly high-powered neutron bomb in the Bureau, questioning any basic conclusion that they had come to. (245)
* * * if they had found something like that, I am sure that if we had received it, it would be only after Mr. Hoover had examined it carefully himself and didn't dare withhold it from us. now that is looking from now rather than at the time that we didn't think he would deliberately lie. (246)
The CIA
The CIA staff exhaustively analyzed the significance of Oswald's activities in the Soviet Union, but there was no corresponding CIA analysis of the significance of Oswald's contacts with pro-Castro and anti-Castro groups in the ;United States * * *. All of the evidence reviewed by this committee suggests that these investigators conducted a thorough, professional investigation and analysis of the information they had. (254)
Mr. HELMS. At the time that the Warren Commission was formed, the agency did everything in its power to cooperate with the Warren Commission and with the FBI, the FBI having the lead in the investigation. It was the agency's feeling that since this tragedy had taken place in the United States, that the FBI and the Department of Justice would obviously have the leading edge in conducting the investigation, and that the agency would cooperate with them in every way it was possible, and the same applied to the Warren Commission. (256)
I thought we made a major effort to be as cooperative and prompt and helpful as possible. But in recent years I have been through enough to recognize that you can't make a flat statement against anything, so I don't know. Maybe there were some places where it wasn't as prompt as it should have been. but I am not in a position to identify them.(263)
Examples of attitudes and relationships
Introduction
Inadequate followup--Odio-Hall incident
It is a matter of some importance to the Commission that Mrs. Odio's allegations either be proved of disproved. * * * In view of our time schedule we would appreciate receiving a report as soon a possible. (266)
Hall stated that William Seymour is similar in appearance to Lee Harvey Oswald and that Seymour speaks only a few words of Spanish. In connection with the revelations of Hall, you will note that the name Loran Hall bears some phonetic resemblance to the name Leon Oswald. (267)
The letter related that the FBI was continuing its investigation into this matter and hoped to obtain a photograph of Hall to show Odio. Hoover promised to report any other developments promptly.
On September 16, 1964, the FBI located Loran Eugene Hall in Johnsondale, Calif. Hall had been identified as a participant in numerous anti-castro activities. He told the FBI that in September of 1963 he was in dallas, soliciting aid in connection with anti-Castro activities. He said he had visited Mrs. Odio. He was accompanied by Lawrence Howard, a Mexican-American from East Los Angeles, and one William Seymour from Arizona. He stated that Seymour is similar in appearance to Lee Harvey Oswald; he speaks only a few words of Spanish, as Mrs. Odio testified one of the men who visited her, did. While the FBI had not yet completed its investigation into this matter at the time the report went to press, the Commission has concluded that Lee Harvey Oswald was not at Mrs. Odio's apartment in September of 1963. (268)
I am guessing and I have to suppose that this is the way it must have happened, that I received a phone call from my Los Angeles office and probably from the supervisor who handled the case, this particular case, in the Los Angeles office at that time. (272)
Brown testified that he would have been given the background information for the interview during this phone call.(273)
Had I not seen [the interview reports], I think that I would have been able to tell you that I drove to Kernville [Hall's residence' one day back in 1964 and interviewed somebody in connection with the assassination, and then again went back the next day or two to get a picture, which failed to come out; and that was it. (280)
The only thing that comes to my mind is that they may have been trying to get everything transcribed to complete an investigative report * * *. There may have been some urgency to get the report, investigative report, put together and in the mail.(282)
Q. The Sylvia Odio incident was never resolved to your satisfaction, was it?
Unreasonable delays
I would appreciate your forwarding to this Commission copies of all records in your files which contain information about Jack Ruby or the persons mentioned in part C of the enclosed memorandum. (284)
Some of the people included in part C of the memorandum were Eva Grant, Earl Ruby, Ralph Paul, George Senator, Barney Baker, H.L. Hunt, Lamar Hunt, Louis J. McWillie, and Barney Ross.
This letter and the memorandum prepared by Messrs. Highboard and Griffin was not sent. The Memorandum was delivered by hand to representative of CIA at a meeting on March 12, 1964. (285)
The Commission, Mr. Rankin said, would be interested in any information held by the CIA on Jack Ruby. Mr. Rankin said the Commission staff had prepared a roundup on Ruby, a copy of which he handed to Mr. Helms. He said he would appreciate any file reflections or comments that CIA analysts might make on this material. Mr. Rankin and members of his staff then discussed Ruby's confirmed trip to Havana in 1959. The Commission has received information from an unspecified source that Ruby was in Havana again in 1963 under a Czech passport. Mr. Rankin asked whether CIA could provide any assistance in verifying this story. Mr. Helms replied that CIA would be limited in its possibility of assisting, [deleted]. (287)
At that time we requested that you review this memorandum and submit to the Commission any information contained in your files regarding matters covered in the memorandum, as well as any other analysis by your representatives which you believed might be useful to the Commission.
As you know, this Commission is nearing the end of its investigation. We would appreciate hearing from you as soon as possible whether you are in a position to comply with this request in the near future. (288)
This memorandum will confirm our earlier statement to the Commission to the effect that an examination of Central Intelligence Agency files has produced no information of Jack ruby or his activities. The Central Intelligence Agency has no indication that Ruby and Lee Harvey Oswald were associated, or might have been connected in any manner.
The records of this Agency were reviewed for information about the relatives, friends, and associates of Ruby named in your summary of his background. Our records do not reflect any information pertaining to these persons. (289)
Judge Griffin concluded from this that:
* * * we had received oral communications from the CIA telling us that they had no information and that we ultimately insisted on their putting their oral communications to us in writing. That, I believe, is why the CIA letter came so late. (291)
We have a problem here for your determination. [Staff officer] does not desire to respond directly to paragraph 2 of that letter [of February 12, 1964] which made levy for our material which had gotten into the hands of the Secret Service since November 23 * * * Unless you feel otherwise [staff officer] would prefer to wait out the Commission on the matter covered by paragraph 2. (293)
Misleading testimony
On Mr. McCone's behalf, I had all our records searched to see if there had been any contacts at any time prior to President Kennedy's assassination by anyone in the Central Intelligence Agency with Lee Harvey Oswald. We checked our card files and our personnel files and all our records.
Now, this check turned out to be negative. In addition I got in touch with those officers who were in positions of responsibility at the times in question to see if anybody had any recollection of any contact having even been suggested with this man. This also turned out to be negative, so there is no material in the Central Intelligence Agency, either in the records or in the minds of any of the individuals, that there was any contact had or even contemplated with him. (299)
It makes little difference now, but [deleted] had at one time an [deleted] interest in Oswald. As soon as I had heard Oswald's name, I recalled that as [deleted] I had discussed--sometime in summer 1960--with [deleted], the laying on of interview[s] through [deleted] or other suitable channels. * * *
I was phasing into my next cover assignment [deleted] at the time. Thus, I would have left our country shortly after Oswald's arrival. I do not know what action developed thereafter. * * *
It was partly out of curiosity to learn if Oswald's wife would actually accompany him to our country, partly out of interest in the Harvey story. (300)
Withheld information
The DDP wishes to have from you a short but comprehensive memorandum which highlights the basic issues or positions entered into by the Agency in its dealings with the Commission. For example, Rankin views as to how improvements might be made in protecting the President's life. Further, they will probably ask questions regarding the possibilities that a conspiracy existed. Such general questioning certainly necessitates that the DCI (Director of Central Intelligence, John McCone) be made aware of the positions taken during previous interviews. I raised with [staff employee] the nature of the recent information which you are processing which originated with the [deleted] source. I informed him that in your view this would raise a number of new factors with the Commission, that it should not go to the Commission prior to the Director's appearance unless he have first had some preliminary reaction or made sure that the Director if fully aware of its implications since it could well serve as the basis for detailed questioning. The DDP stated that he would review this carefully and make a decision as to the question of timing. (301)
Slawson testified:
Q. Whatever became of the possibility of using informants?
Q. What, if any, information did the CIA provide you concerning Tarabochia and Sourwine?
* * * the reports were written by another agent. I did have occasion to see them. There was no information gleaned from either of these unusual sources that had a bearing on the Assassination or a possible conspiracy and so forth. (309)
Q. * * * you were charged with furnishing the Warren Commission information form the CIA, information that you thought was relevant?
Did you know that on November 22, 1963, about the time Kennedy was assassinated, a CIA case officer was passing a poison pen, offering a poison pen to a high level cuban to use to assassinate Castro:
Mr. HELMS. In retrospect, Mr. Dodd, I would have done a lot of thing very differently. I would like to point out something since we are so deeply into this. When one government is trying to upset another government and the operation is successful, people get killed. I don't know whether they are assassinated or whether they are killed in a coup. We had one recently in Afghanistan. The head of the Afghanistan Government was killed. Was he assassinated or killed in a coup? I don't know.
These semantics are all great. I want to say there is not a chief of state or chief of government in the world today who is not aware of the fact that his life is in jeopardy. He takes every possible protection to guard himself. The relevance of one plot or another plot and its effect of the course of events I would have a very hard time assessing, and I thing you would, too.
Suppose I had gone down and told them and said, yes; you know we tried to do this. How would it have altered the outcome of the Warren Commission proceeding?
Mr. HELMS. I think it was a mistake, no doubt about it. I think we should have shoved the whole thing over. I would have backed up a truck and taken all the documents down and put them on the Warren Commission's desk. (334)
Throughout our investigation the CIA has been sending us memorandums. The CIA made no attempt to withhold any information from the Commission that it believed was pertinent. (335)
Q. * * * it was your impression as of September 6, 1964, near the end of the investigation, that the CIA had made no attempt to withhold any information form the Commission that the CIA believed was pertinent?
I think that if there had been information known to the Commission about a possible assassination effort of Castro by the CIA, that the Commission would have looked into it. I would have followed those facts to see if there was any connection with the Kennedy assassination. (341)
I think that it would have affected it * * * How I am not completely sure * * * Although I am cognizant of the fact that the Warren Commission at least to the best of my recollection, did look into every Cuban connection that Oswald head, it is possible that this additional fact might have led to further inquiry. (342)
I think given that information, you would have pursued some lines of inquiry probably harder than you might have otherwise pursued them.
I have no reason to believe one way or the other it would have changed the result or turned it around or anything of that kind. I have no information on that. It is simply I believe if I had been a member of the Warren Commission, I would have believed that to be relevant information which would require investigation. (344)
Perhaps naively but I thought that the appointment of Allen Dulles to the Commission would insure that the Commission had access to anything that the CIA had. I am astounded to this day that Mr. Dulles did not at least make that information available to the other commissioners. (345)
My impression of the materials that I have been furnished by you with regard to the report of the Senate committee in its investigation is that there is a considerable amount being withheld and there may be a lot of false testimony in some of the information furnished in connection with what they describe as the eight assassination attempts.
To me as a lawyer in my experience in life for a good many years, I have the impression that where they felt that you had some other information or the Senate Committee had some other information like an Inspector General's report, or other things that they could not avoid, you got something out of them, and there is a vast amount that they either are not telling or they are telling their own version of the way they want it to look, and I would not rely on any of it. I don't mean that you have not gotten some material but I don't think you have gotten all of it by any means. (346)
We were unaware then of any Mafia plots. I would not really have gone through my head that that would have been a matter. It never would have occurred to me that the FBI would cover up anything. If you ask me the question, if the FBI failed to do something it should have done, would they have covered that up? My answer to you is, even then, would have been yes, they probably would; not covering up information that somebody else was guilty or something of this kind, but if the bureau made any mistake or anything for which the public could criticize the Bureau, the Bureau would do its best to conceal the information from anybody. (347)
I think that if I had known at the time that I would have been concerned to find out more directly whether the CIA had any information that might provide the Commission with leads on these other issues that we were looking at or issues that we never turned up. In my mind the fact, if it is a fact, that the CIA was trying to arrange the assassination of Mr. Castro at the time, the withholding of that fact by itself I don't think is particularly significant to anything the Commission did.
What I am saying is the fact that the CIA was attempting, if it was, to assassinate Castro, I don't understand what that has to do with Oswald or the Warren Commission investigation or anything of that sort. I think that the question of whether the CIA withheld evidence that would have provided leads to the Commission that might have connected Oswald to presumably Cuban contacts that we were not able to connect him with ourselves, that clearly would have been significant. The fact that the CIA was apparently attempting to assassinate Castro, might have provided a motive for them to withhold information if indeed they did, but the fact that they were trying to assassinate Castro had nothing to do with the issue. (348)
Q. * * * you clearly raise questions about Ruby's possibly becoming involved in purchasing Jeeps for Castro, which is a political activity on which the CIA would have some information or they would be derelict in their duty?
We needed to fill that in, in some way, but that is why the Cuban link is so important. If we had known that the CIA wanted to assassinate Castro, then all the Cuban motivations that we were exploring about this made much, much more sense. If we had further known that the CIA was involved with organized criminal figures in an assassination attempt in the Caribbean, then we would have had a completely different perspective on this thing.
But, because we did not have those links at this point, there was nothing to tie the underworld in with Cuba and thus nothing to tie them in with Oswald, nothing to tie them in with the assassination of the President. (349)
Submitted by:
GARY T. CORNWELL,
KENNETH D. KLEIN,
MICHAEL EWING,
Staff Report of the Select Committee on Assassinations
U.S. House of Representatives
*Mr. Katzenbach's testimony and deposition can be found in III HSCA--JFK hearings before the select committee on Assassinations, 94th Cong. 2d Session (Washington, D.C.:U.S. Government Printing Office, 1979),pp. 642, 680 et seq.
STAFF COUNSEL. How would you have done it differently?
GRIFFEN. Let me first of all preface it Hubert and I began to feel after a couple of months that perphaps there was not a great deal of interest in what we were doing, that they looked upon the Ruby activity, based upon information that they saw as being largely peripheral to the questions that they were concerned with. We did have a disagreement, pretty clear disagreement, on how to go about conducting the investigation and I think that again was another reason why perhaps I would say the operation was not as effective as I would have liked to have seen it (51)
A. No, sir, we did not.
Q. You were just going to get through whenever you finished.
A. Absolutely not [sic], there was no deadline of any kind for us, no deadline of any kind. (103)
Q. No, it was November 30, after Kennedy was shot---
WARREN. Of 1962?
Q. Of 1963. And then Johnson had to run in 1964.
WARREN. My gosh, I guess that's right.
Q. It must not have been much of a factor.
WARREN. No, no, really it was no factor. It was no factor at all, no factor at all. (104)
Q. The President never made suggestions?
WARREN. Never once in any way, shape, or form. In fact we didn't talk to him about it. (105)
Mr. McCLOY. They have.
CHAIRMAN. I'm sure they have, but I did not want to put the CIA into this thing unless they put themselves in.
Mr. McCLOY. Don't we have to ask them if we're on notice that they have?
CHAIRMAN. We have to do it with all of them. *** We have not done it with any of them yet because we have not been in that position *** I think we have to ask them. (128)
CHAIRMAN. Haven't the CIA any contact with the FBI?
MR. DULLES. I don't think they'll do it because the FBI has no authority to pass these reports to anyone else without this Commission's approval.
Mr. McCLOY. The CIA knows everything about it. I don't know how they know it but John McCone knows everything.
Mr. DULLES. He has not seen the reports because I've checked with people yesterday at great length. I have no authority to give it to them and he has not seen the exhibits that we now have, that describe Oswald while he was Russia.
CHAIRMAN. I see no reason why we should not give John McCone a copy of this report and let him see it. He can see mine if he wants to...
Mr. DULLES. I can make mine available. I wouldn't want to do it without approval of this Commission.
Senator RUSSELL. I have never been able to understand why it is that every agency acts like it's the sole agency in the Government. There is very little interchange of information between the departments in the United States Government. The entire view is that they are a separate closed department, and there is not interchange of information. (139)
When the Chief Justice and I we just briefly reflecting on this we said if that was true and it ever came out and could be established, then you would have people think that there was a conspiracy to accomplish this assassination that nothing the Commission did or anybody could dissipate.
Representative BOGGS. You are so right.
Mr. DULLES. Oh, terrible.
Representative BOGGS. Its implications of this are fantastic, don't you think so?
CHAIRMAN. Terrific.
Mr. RANKIN. To have anybody admit to it, even if it was the fact, I am sure that there wouldn't at this point be anything to prove it.
Mr. DULLES. Lee, if this were true, why would it be particularly in their interest--I could see it would be in their interest to get rid of this man but why would it be in their interest to say he is clearly the only guilty one? I mean I don't see that argument that you raise particularly shows an interest***.
Mr. RANKIN. They would like to have us fold up and quit.
Reprensentative BOGGS. This closes the case, you see. Don't you see?
Mr. DULLES. Yes, I see that.
Mr. RANKIN. They found the man. There is nothing more to do. The Commission supports their conclusions, and we can go on home and that is the end of it.
Mr. DULLES. But that puts the burden right on them. If he was not the killer, and they employed him, they are already it, you see. So your argument is correct if they are sure that this is going to close the case, but if it don't close the case, they are worse off than ever by doing this.
Representative BOGGS. Yes, I would think so. And of course, we are all even gaining in the realm of speculation I don't even like to see this being taken down.
Mr. DULLES. Yes. I think this record ought to be destroyed. Do you think we need a record of this? (143)
Mr. DULLES. Oh, yes.
Senator RUSSELL. They would be the first to deny it. Your agents would have done the same thing.
Mr. DULLES. Exactly***.
Senator COOPER. If you have these people up (from Texas) and examine them the FBI will know that.
Mr. RANKIN. They already know about this apparently *** I just don't think that they (Texas officials) are going to come out and say they fabricated this, if it is a fabrication. It is too serious for that.
Representative BOGGS. Of course, we get ourselves into a real box. You have got to do everything on Earth to establish the facts one way or the other. And without doing that, why everything concerned, including everyone of us is doing a very grave disservice***.
Senator COOPER. *** before you asked Mr. Hoover you present us with all the proof to the contrary, because as you say, if he presents all this proof to the contrary, then the situation changes a little bit. It would appear to him that you are trying to impeach his testimony***.
Mr. McCLOY. Do we have a statement from Mr. Hoover that this man was not an agent? Was that communicated in the record?
Mr. RANKIN. Yes***.
Mr. McCLOY. I would like to examine again this relationship between the Department of Justice and the FBI. Just who would it be embarrassing for the Attorney General of the United States to inquire of one of his agencies whether or not this man who was alleged to have killed the President of the United States, was an agent. Does the embarrassment supersede the importance of getting the best evidence in a situation as this?
Mr. RANKIN. Well, I think it is a question of whether we have to put him into that position in order to get the job done, because there is in my opinion, not any question but what there will be more friction, more difficulty with his carrying out his responsibilities, and I think we have a very real problem in this Commission in that if we have meetings all the time and they know what it is about *** and we are meeting rather rapidly here in the last few days, and they can guess probably what it is about, certainly after the meeting with the Texas people***.
Senator COOPER. *** In view of all the rumors and statements that have been made not only here but abroad, I think to ask the President's brother, the dead President, to do this, it wouldn't have any backing in it. It would have no substance in his purpose but some crazy people would translate it from his official postion to a personal position. It may sound farfetched but he would be implying as a person that something was wrong. You can't overlook any implications.
Mr. McCLOY. I think that would perhaps be an element in the thing, but it still wouldn't divert me from asking this man who happens to be the Attorney General whose sworn duty is to enforce justice, to ask him just what is within his knowledge in regard to such a serious thing as this. It is [an] awkward affair. But as you said the other day, truth is our only client *** I think we may have to make this first step, that the Senator speaks about, but I don't think that we could recognize that any door is closed to us, unless the President closes it to us, and in the search for truth***.
Mr. RANKIN. I don't see how the country is ever going to be willing to accept it if we don't satisfy them on this particular issue, not only with them but the CIA and every other agency***.
Mr. DULLES. Since this has been so much out in the public, what harm would be in talking to Hoover without waiving any right to make any investigation in the public***. There is a terribly hard thing to disprove, you know. How do you disprove a fellow who was not your agent? How do you disprove it?
Representative BOGGS. You could disprove it, couldn't you?
Mr. DULLES. No.
Representative BOGGS. I know, ask questions about something--
Mr. DULLES. I never knew how to disprove it.
Representative BOGGS. Did you have agents above whom you had no record whatsoever?
Mr. DULLES. The record might not be on paper. But on paper we would know and you could say this meant the agent and somebody else could say it meant another agent.
Representative BOGGS. Let's take a specific case; that fellow Powers was one of your men.
Mr. DULLES. Oh, yes, he was not an agent. He was an employee.
Representative BOGGS. There was no problem in proving he was employed by the CIA.
Mr. DULLES. No. We had a signed contract.
Representative BOGGS. Let's say Powers did not have a signed contract but was recruited by someone in CIA. The man who recruited him would know, wouldn't he?
CHAIRMAN. Wouldn't tell it under oath?
Mr. DULLES. I wouldn't think he would tell it under oath, no. *** He ought not tell it under oath. Maybe no tell it to his own Government but wouldn't tell it any other way.
Mr. McCLOY. Wouldn't he tell it to his own chief?
Mr. DULLES. He might or might not. If he was a bad one then he wouldn't.
Representative BOGGS. What you do is you make out a problem if this be true, make our problem utterly impossible because you say this rumor can't be dissipated under any circumstances.
Mr. DULLES. I don't think it can unless you believe Mr. Hoover, and so forth and so on, which probably most of the people will.
Mr. McCLOY. Allen, suppose somebody when you were head of the CIA came to you, another Government agency and said specifically, "If you will tell us," suppose the President of the United States comes to you and says, "Will you tell me, Mr. Dulles?"
Mr. DULLES. I would tell the President of the United States anything, yes; I am under his control. He is my boss. I wouldn't necessarily tell anybody else, unless the President authorized me to do it. We had that come up at times***.
Mr. RANKIN. If that is all that is necessary, I think we could get the President to direct anybody working for the Government to answer this question....
Mr. DULLES. What I was getting at, I think Mr. Hoover would say certainly he didn't have anything to do with this fellow. (155)
Mr. DULLES. Not this irresponsible.
Mr. McCLOY. Well, I can't say that I have run into a fellow comparable to Oswald but I have run into some very limited mentalities both in the CIA and the FBI. [Laughter.]
CHAIRMAN. Under agents, the regular agents, I think that would be right, but they and all other agencies do employ undercover men who are of terrible character.
Mr. DULLES. Terribly bad characters.
Senator RUSSELL. Limited intelligence; even the city police departments do it.
CHAIRMAN. It takes almost that kind of a man to do a lot of this undercover work. (157)
CHAIRMAN. I don't believe we should apologize or make it look that we are in any way reticent about making any investigation that comes to the Commission. But on the other hand, I don't want to be unfriendly or unfair to him***.
Mr. RANKIN. What I was fearful of was the mere process will cause him to think that we are really investigating him.
CHAIRMAN. If you tell him we are going down there to do it, we are investigating him aren't we?
Mr. RANKIN. I think it is inherent.
CHAIRMAN. If we are investigating him, we are investigating the rumor against him, we are investigating him, that is true. (158)
Mr. RANKIN. Part of our difficulty in regard to it is that they have no problem. They have decided that it is Oswald who committed the assassination, they have decided that no one else is involved, they have decided that no one else is involved, they have decided***.
Senator RUSSELL. They have tried the case and reached a verdict on every aspect.
Representative BOGGS. You have put your finger on it. (159)
A. I was interviewed by a CIA agent once when I was younger.
Q. Did you form any impressions about them?
A. I was favorably impressed. (174)
* * * * * * * * * * * *
I don't think that the American Government would have ever or would today stand by and upon proven charges that their President had been killed at the order of some other government, would just allow it to go by. They would either insist that the people in that government be prosecuted or if they weren't I suppose we would invade. So we thought we might be triggering a war with Cuba. But again that was something that the chips would have to fall where they may. (188)
A. Right. (190)
Q. Was it pursued further when you got a reply that they were only excepting that they felt would be a lead?
A. I think the decision was made at the time that, while we were really not very happy with the reply, we couldn't really disprove it. That was not, as I recall, pursued beyond that point.
Q. Is it fair to say that the matter was then dropped?
A. To the best of my recollection, yes, sir. (200)
Q. What effect, if any, did that have on the relationship between the staff and the Bureau?
A. I think it established in our minds that we had to be worried about them * * * I think we never forgot the incident. We were always alert, we were concerned about the problem * * * There was a staff meeting about it, as I recall. One of the few staff meetings I have a general recollection of at this point seems to me was one that Rankin called in which we were all brought in on this, and we were all told about the problem and once it had been discovered there was a discussion about whether our discovery should be revealed to the FBI and how should we proceed with it.
Q. Would it be fair to characterize the incident then as perhaps producing a more healthy skepticism on the part of the staff and less trust of the Bureau?
A. I think that is right * * *
Q. Would it be fair to say that the incident, far from adversely affecting the quality of your investigation, may have heightened it?
A. No, I don't think that is true.
Q. If it made you more skeptical and more probing would it help the investigation?
A. No, I don't think it did. The reason I say that is that I think it basically set the standard for the kind of judgment that was going to be made about how we were going to deal with these problems, and the decision made there was that there was not going to be confrontation, they were to be given an opportunity to explain it. So the decision was really, as I recall, to go back and give them an opportunity to clean up their act rather than to carry on a secret investigation that might be designed to lay a foundation for our further impeachment of them. (202)
A. Well, they were fairly good at first and then as we became more critical at times and the Hosty incident came up and the question about Oswald and the Director being required to swear personally about whether Oswald had any connection with the FBI and our asking the Secret Service from time to time to investigate things the FBI had already investigated and go back over their tracks, it didn't warm up much at least on a friendly basis.
Q. Did it at any time become an adversary relationship?
A. Well, I went to see Mr. Hoover before we finally put out our report and I had known him when I had been with the Department of Justice for 6 years and always had cordial relations but he was pretty feisty when I saw him, any friendship we had had in the past was not very apparent then.
Q. Did you think at that time that you were getting the full cooperation of the Bureau?
A. Well, I thought so to this extent. I thought they would never lie about anything and that if we had any difficulty it might be that they would not bore in as hard as we would like to have them but I thought we could tell that and insist on either following it up which we did a great many times by sending them back to do it again and to do it more thoroughly, or putting the Secret Service to do it, and they resented that so much that they were a little more careful after that about trying to be more thorough and so forth. But to have them just lie to us, I never anticipated that. The things that have happened in the Bureau in the last few years have been revealed in the press and so forth. I never thought the Bureau was capable of that. When I was with the Department of Justice I never thought they were capable of it and I didn't think agents would do such things. So I was rather sanguine about that and I don't think the country believed the FBI would do such things. (203)
A. Yes. I came to know one man particularly well, Rayman Rocca, and I came to like him and trust him both * * * My impression overall was very favorable of him. I thought he was very intelligent and tried in every way to be honest and helpful with me. (207)
*The FBI's response to the assassination and the creation of the Warren Commission is detailed in another section of this report. (224) The discussion here focuses on its attitude after the Commission was set up.
A. No, not really. (283)
A. Nothing. * * * I talked to Mr. Sourwine * * * But he and Senator Eastland were not willing to give us access to the claimed contact they had and nothing came of the request that we have them for information from that. There was no further communication.
Q. What was your final opinion about this incident?
A. My final opinion, and to my recollection, it was also J. Lee Rankin's, was that Sourwine and Eastland were trying to use this alleged contact as a way of finding out inside information about the Warren investigation which they could use for their own political purposes. (306)
A. I am sure it was to the effect that they didn't know anything about the contacts. That was probably just the end of it.
Q. Do you recall whether or not the CIA provided you any information about Sourwine or Tarabochia concerning raids in Cuba?
A. I understand the question as whether the CIA supplied me with any information about raids in Cuba in connection with Sourwine and Tarabochia. My answer is no. (307)
A. No sir, I was instructed to reply to inquiries from the Warren Commission for information from the Agency. I was not asked to initiate any particular thing.
Q. * * * in other words if you weren't asked for it you didn't give it?
A. That's right, sir. (324)
A. No, I did not.
Q. Would you have drawn a link in your mind between that and the Kennedy assassination?
A. I certainly think that that would have been--become an absolutely vital factor in analyzing the events surrounding the Kennedy assassination. (329)
Mr. DODD. Wasn't that really for the Warren Commission to determine?
Mr. HELMS. I think that is absolutely correct, but they did not have that chance apparently. (333)
A. That is right.
Q. Did the CIA, or anyone, say, between the CIA and you, ever tell the Warren Commission members about the CIA assassination plots on Castro?
A. No; not to my knowledge.
Q. Do you believe that would have been pertinent to your work?
A. Yes. (337)
A. Absolutely. * * *
Q. Would you have known the name Meyer Lansky in 1964?
A. Yes. That kind of information would not have significantly affected our decision unless we knew of two things, at least unless we knew that the Mafia, the underworld types, were being used by the CIA in connection with international Cuban activities. If we had known that the CIA in anyway was utilizing underworld people in connection with any kind of Cuban activity, that might have said more for us--most particularly if we had, of course, known that there was an effort on some part of the people in our Government to assassinate Castro. * * * Oswald was the person who assassinated the President. There was no showing that Oswald had any connection with organized crime. Therefore, there was no reason to think that, simply because Ruby was involved in organized crime, that that would have been linked to the assassination of the President.
G. ROBERT BLAKEY,
Chief Counsel and Staff Director;
Deputy Chief Counsel;
Assistant Deputy Chief Counsel;
DAN L. HARDWAY,
LESLIE H. WIZELMAN,
Researchers.
REFERENCES
(1) Letter from FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover to President Lyndon B. Johnson, Mar. 73, 1963 (JFK Doc. 015037).
(2) Memorandum to the files by Presidential Assistant Walter Jenkins, Nov. 24, 1963 (JFK Doc. 015038).
(3) Deposition of Nicholas deS. Katzenbach, Aug. 4, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations, p. 46 (JFK Doe. 014569).
(4) Ibid., p. 8.
(5) Memorandum from Walter Jenkins to Bill Moyers, Nov. 25, 1963 (JFK Doe. 015038).
(6) Memorandum from Deputy Attorney General Nicholas deS. Katzen-
bach to Bill Moyers, Nov. 2.5, 1963.
(7) See ref. 3, pp. 59-60.
(8) "Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, Lyndon B. Johnson, Book 1: Nov. 22, 1963 to June 30, 1964" (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1965).
(9) Leon Jaworski interview, "Oral History Project," p. 21 (JFK Doe. 003411).
(10) Memorandum from Waiter Jenkins to President Lyndon B. Johnson,
Nov. 29, 1963 (JFK Doe. 015039).
(11) See ref. 3, p. 9.
(12) Memorandum from FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover to Messrs. Tolson, Belmont, Mohr, Sullivan, DeLoach, and Rosen, Nov. 29, 1963 (JFK Doe. 015040).
(13) Lyndon B. Johnson, "The Vantage Point" (New York: Popular Library edition, 1972), p. 26.
(14) Id. at p. 27.
(15) Ibid.
(16) "The Memoirs of Chief Justice Earl Warren" (Garden City, N.Y.:
Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1977), pp. 356-358.
(17) Chief Justice Earl Warren, "Oral History Project," pp. 16, 17 (JFK
Doc. 003409).
(18) Testimony of Gerald R. Ford, Sept. 21, 1978, hearings before the House Select Committee on Assassinations, 95th Cong., 2d sess. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1979), vol. III, p. 578 (hereinafter referred to as Ford testimony, Sept. 21, 1978, III HSCA-JFK hearings, 578).
(19) See ref. 13, p. 26.
(20) Ibid.
(21) See ref. 9, pp. 22, 23.
(22) Id. at p. 24.
(23) See ref. 6; see ref. 2.
(24) Memorandum from Assistant FBI Director Cartha DeLoach to Associate PSI Director Clyde Tolson, Dec. 12, 1963 (JFK Doe. 015040).
(25) Executive session testimony of Norman Redlich, Nov. 8, 1977, hearings before the House Select Committee on Assassinations, pp. 144, 74 (JFK Doc. 014665) (see attachment A, this staff report); executive session testimony of Arlen Specter, Nov. 8, 1977, hearings before the House Select Committee on Assassinations, pp. 57, 11 (JFK Doe. 014665) (see attachment A of this staff report ).
(26) See ref. 13, p. 26.
(27) Memorandum to the files of Warren Commission staff member Melvin
Eisenberg, Feb. 17, 1964 (JFK Doe. 015041).
(28) Ibid.
(29) The New York Times, Nov. 26, 1963, p. 15.
(30) "The Whole Truth," The New York Times, Nov. 26, 1963, p. 36.
(31) The Washington Post, Nov. 26, 1963.
(32) "Indians Believe Oswald Was Only a Tool," The New York Times,
Nov. 28, 1963, p. 33.
(33) See ref. 25, Redlich executive session testimony, p. 71; see ref. 25, Specter executive session testimony, p. 52; executive session testimony of Wesley Liebeler, Nov. 15, 1977, hearings before the House Select Committee on Assassinations, p. 114 (JFK Doe. 014668) (see attachment B of this staff report); executive session testimony of Howard P. Willens, Nov. 17, 1977, hearings before the House Select Committee on Assassinations, p. 85 (JFK Doc. 014694) (see attachment C of this staff report).
(34) Executive session testimony of W. David Slawson, Nov. 15, 1977, Hearings before the House Select Committee on Assassinations, p. 88 (JFK Doc. 014668) (see attachment B of this staff report).
(35) See ref. 25, Specter executive session testimony, p. 7.
(36) See ref. 25, Redlich executive session testimony, p. 71.
(37) Executive session testimony of Judge Burr W. Griffin, Nov. 17, 1977, hearings before the House Select Committee on Assassinations, p. 19 (JFK Doc. 014694) (see attachment C of this staff report).
(38) See ref. 34, Slawson executive session testimony, p. 10.
(39) Id. at p. 87.
(40) Id. at p. 88.
(41) See ref. 33, Liebeler executive session testimony, p. 143.
(42) Id. at p. 157.
(43) See ref. 18, Ford testimony, Sept. 21, 1978, HSCA-JFK hearings.
(44) Testimony of John J. McCloy, Sept. 21, 1978, hearings before the House Select Committee on Assassinations, 95th Cong. 2d sess. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1979), vol. III, p. 605 (hereinafter referred to as McCloy testimony, III HSCA-JFK hearings, 605).
(45) Deposition of J. Lee Rankin, Aug. 17, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations, p. 6 (JFK Doc. 014027) See attachment D of this staff report).
(46) Warren Commission executive session transcript, Dec. 5, 1963 (JFK Doc. 000493.
(47) See ref. 18, Ford testimony Sept. 21, 1978, III HSCA-JFK hearings 47.
(48) See ref. 33, Willens executive session testimony, p. 91.
(49) See ref. 25, Specter executive session testimony, p. 9.
(50) See ref. 25, Redlich executive session testimony, p. 79.
(51) See ref. 37, Griffin executive session testimony, p. 15.
(52) See ref. 25, Specter executive session testimony, p. 10.
(53) Id. at p. 48.
(54) See ref. 34, Slawson executive session testimony, p. 60.
(55) See ref. 33, Willens executive session testimony, p. 105.
(56) See ref. 37, Griffin executive session testimony, pp. 11-12.
(57) See ref. 25, Redlich executive session testimony, pp. 73-74.
(58) See ref. 34, Slawson executive session testimony, p. 58.
(59) See ref. 25, Specter executive session testimony, p. 10.
(60) See ref. 45, Rankin deposition, p. 96.
(61) See ref. 33, Liebeler executive session testimony, pp. 118-119.
(62) Ibid.
(63) See ref. 45, Rankin deposition, p. 43.
(64) Id. at pp. 97-98.
(65) See ref. 34, Griffin executive session testimony, p. 59.
(66) Ibid.
(67) See ref. 25, Redlich executive session testimony, p. 78.
(68) See ref. 25, Specter executive session testimony, p. 9.
(69) See ref. 25, Redlich executive session testimony, p. 129.
(70) See ref. 44, McCloy testimony, Sept. 21, 1978, III JFK hearing, 602.
(71) See ref. 18, Ford testimony, Sept. 21, 1978, III HSCA-JFK hearings, 583.
(72) Id. at 582.
(73) See ref. 37, Griffin executive testimony, pp. 17-18.
(74) See ref. 25, Specter executive session testimony, p. 9.
(75) See ref. 33, Willens executive session testimony, pp. 94-96.
(76) See ref. 37, Rankin deposition, p. 13.
(77) Id. at PD. 14--15.
(78) See ref. 25, Specter executive session testimony, pp. 16-17.
(79) See ref. 33, Willens executive session testimony, p. 97.
(80) See ref. 25, Redlich executive session testimony, p. 82.
(81) See ref. 37, Griffin executive session testimony, pp. 22-23.
(82) Id. at p. 82.
(83) See ref. 25, Specter executive session testimony, p. 18.
(84) See ref. 34, Slawson executive session testimony, p. 14.
(85) See ref. 25, Specter executive session testimony, p. 19.
(86) See ref. 25, Redlich executive session testimony, p. 83.
(87) See ref. 33, Liebeler executive session testimony, p. 127.
(88) Edward J. Epstein, "Inquest" (New York: Viking Press, 1966), p. 131; minutes of the Warren Commission executive session of Sept. 18, 1964 (JFK Doc. 000076).
(89) See ref. 25, Specter executive session testimony, p. 14.
(90) See ref. 44, McCloy testimony, Sept. 21, 197~, HI HSCA-JFK hearings, 607.
(91) "Warren Commission Report," p. 19.
(92) Testimony of John Sherman Cooper, Sept. 21, 1978, hearings before House Select Committee on Assassinations, 95th Cong. 2nd sess. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office 1979) vol.III, p. 600 (Hereinafter referred to as Cooper testimony, Sept. 21, 1978, III HSCA-JFK hearings,).
(93) See ref. 25, Specter executive session testimony, pp. 20-21.
(94) Id. at p. 50.
(95) See ref. 33, Willens executive session testimony, p. 115.
(96) See ref. 25, Specter executive session testimony, p. 64; see ref. 25, Redlich executive session testimony, p. 103.
(97) See ref. 34, Slawson executive session testimony, pp. 4950.
(98) Id. at pp. 86-87.
(99) See ref. 37, Griffin executive session testimony, p. 27.
(100) See ref. 45, Griffin executive session testimony, p. 100.
(101) Id. at p. 101.
(102) See ref. 44, McCloy testimony, Sept. 21, 1978, 111 HSCA-JFK hearings, 601.
(103) See ref. 17, p. 28.
(104) Id. at p. 26.
(105) Id. at p. 17.
(106) See ref. 34, Slawson executive session testimony, p. 52.
(107) See ref. 37, Griffin executive session testimony, p. 10.
(108) Id. at p. 26.
(109) Ibid.
(110) See ref. 33, Willens executive session testimony, p. 125.
(111) Id. at pp. 16-17.
(112) See ref. 25, Rúdlich executive session testimony, p. 144; fn. 25, Specter executive session testimony, p. 57; and fn. 37, p. 24.
(113) See ref. 33, Liebeler executive session testimony, p. 154; see ref. 34, p. 101.
(114) See ref. 33, Willens executive session testimony, p. 130.
(115) See ref. 34, Slawson executive session testimony, p. 11; see ref. 25, iredlich executive session testimony, pp. 74-75; see ref. 33, Liebeler executive session testimony, p. 154; see ref. 25, Specter executive session testimony, p. 11.
(116) See ref. 34, p. 11.
(117) Id. at pp. 101-102.
(118) See ref. 44, Cooper testimony, Sept. 21, 19T8, III HSCA-JFK hearings, 601-02.
(119) See ref. 18, Ford testimony, Sept. 21, 1978, III HSCA -JFK hearings, 589.
(120) See ref. 25, Redlich executive session testimony, pp. 146-147.
(121) Ibid.
(122) See ref. 46, p. 1.
(123) Id. at p. 2.
(124) Id. at p. 39.
(125) S.J. Res. 137, Public Law 88-202.
(126) See ref. 46, p. 8.
(127) See ref. 46, Dec. 19, :1963, p. 3 (JFK Doc. 000501).
(128) Id. at p. 12.
(129) See ref. 46, Dec. 16, 1963, p. 11 (JFK Doc. 000475).
(130) Id. at p. 12.
(131) Id. at p. 18.
(132) Id. at p. 14.
(133) Ibid.
(134) Id. at p. 43.
(135) Id. at p. 44.
(136) Id. at p. 9.
(137) Id. at p. 15.
(138) Id. at p. 13.
(139) Id. at pp. 46-47.
(140) Id. at p. 22.
(141) Letter from J. Lee Rankin to Richard M. Helms, Mar. 16, 1964 (JFK Doc. 000094 and 003872); Memorandum from Richard M. Helms to J. Lee Rankin, May 6, 1964.
(142) "The Documents," The New Republic, Sept. 27, 1975, p. 28.
(143) Id. at p. 27.
(144) See Warren Commission executive session transcript, Jan. 27, 1964, p. 128 (JFK Doc. 000001).
(145) Id. at p. 137.
(146) Ibid.
(147) Ibid.
(148) Ibid.
(149) Id. at p. 139.
(150) Id. at p. 140.
(151) Id. at p. 141.
(152) Id. at p. 142.
(153) Ibid.
(154) Ibid.
(155) Id. at pp. 143-154.
(156) Ibid.
(157) Id. at p. 163.
(158) Id. at pp. 163-165.
(159) Id. at pp. 168--171.
(160) Id. at p. 177.
(161) Id. at p. 182.
(162) Memorandum from FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover to J. Lee Rankin,
Jan. 27, 1964.
(163) XVII Warren report hearings, 814.
(164) See CE 835, Warren Commission report.
(165) See CE 825, Warren Commission report.
(166) See Committee Report II, D. 3(d).
(167) See Warren Report at pp. 484-490.
(168) Secret Service Doc. No. 767 (JFK Doc. 002769).
(169) See ref. 33, Liebeler executive session testimony, p. 169.
(170) See ref. 46, Apr. 30, 1964, p. 5851 (JFK Doc. 000496).
(171) Ibid.
(172) Id. at pp. 5885-5886.
(173) Id. at p. 5864.
(174) See ref. 33, Liebeler executive session testimony, p. 115.
(175) See ref. 33, Specter executive session testimony, p. 39.
(176) Id. at p. 11.
(177) See ref. 34, Slawson executive session testimony, pp. 15-16.
(178) See ref. 25, Redlich executive session testimony, p. 120.
(179) See ref. 37, Griffin executive session testimony, p. 20.
(180) Ibid., p. 35.
(181) See ref. 25, Redlich executive session testimony, p. 77.
(182) See ref. 33, Specter executive session testimony, p. 11.
(183) See ref. 34, Slawson executive session testimony, p. 16.
(184) See ref. 37, Griffin executive session testimony, p. 20.
(185) Id. at p. 19.
(186) See ref. 34, Slawson executive session testimony, p. 10.
(187) Id. at p. 11.
(188) Id. at p. 13.
(189) See ref. 37, Griffin executive session testimony, p. 18.
(190) Id. at p. 20.
(191) See ref. 34, Slawson executive session testimony, p. 18.
(192) See ref. 25, Redlich executive session testimony, p. 118.
(193) See ref. 33, Specter executive session testimony, p. 39.
(194) See ref. 37, Griffin executive session testimony, p. 28.
(195) See para. 228 ff. of the HSCA staff report on the Warren Commission.
(196) Id. at p. 35.
(197) See ref. 25, Redlich executive session testimony, p. 103.
(198) Id. at p. 72.
(199) Id. at p. 122.
(200) Id. at p. 95.
(201) Memorandum for the record by Howard P. Willens, "Staff Reaction to Hosty Problem," Feb. 12, 1964.
(202) See ref. 37, Griffin executive session testimony, pp. 30-32.
(203) See ref. 45, Rankin deposition, pp. 27-28.
(204) Id. at p. 53.
(205) Ibid.
(206) Id. at pp. 51-52.
(207) See ref. 34, Slawson executive session testimony, p. 17.
(208) Ibid.
(209) Memorandum from W. David Slawson to Raymond Rocca, June 6, 1964
(JFK Doc. 002539 and 002962).
(210) Ibid.
(211) Id. at p. 34.
(212) Ibid.
(213) See Darn. 154, 157 and 158, of the HSCA staff report on the Warren Commission.
(214) See ref. 209, p. 12.
(215) Id. at p. 104.
(216) Id. at p. 105.
(217) See para. 268 of the HSCA staff report on the Warren Commission.
(218) See ref. 34, Slawson executive session testimony, p. 103.
(219) Id. at p. 24.
(220) Id. at p. 61.
(221) See ref. 33, Liebeler executive session testimony, p. 164.
(222) See ref. 25, Redlich executive session testimony, p. 72.
(223) Testimony of James R. Malley, September 20, 1978, 111 HSCA-JFK hearings, 444.
(224) See, e.g., infra para. 216-18.
(225) "The Investigation of the Assassination of President John F. Kennedy; Performance of the/intelligence Agencies," book V, final report, Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with respect to intelligence, 94th Cong, 2d sess. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1976), p. 47 (S. Rept. 94-755) (hereinafter SSC, book V).
(226) Id. at p. 46.
(227) Ibid.
(228) See ref. 225, staff interview with William Sullivan, Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations, SSC, book V, pp. 78-79.
(229) Id. at p. 5.
(230) Id. at p. 85.
(231) Ibid.
(232) Ibid.
(233) See ref. 223, Malley testimony, p. 33.
(234) Id. at p. 41.
(235) Id. at p. 47.
(236) See ref. 223, p. 84.
(237) Ibid.
(238) Ibid.
(239) Ibid.
(240) Ibid.
(241) Memorandum of James H. Gale to Clyde Tolson, September 30, 1964, as quoted in SSC, book V, p. 54 (see ref. 225).
(242) Testimony of Nicholas deB. Katzenbach. September 21, 1978, 111 HSCAJFK hearings, p. 50.
(243) Id. at p. 47.
(244) Ibid.
(245) Id. at p. 53.
(246) See ref. 203, Rankin testimony, p. 48.
(247) See para. 124, IlSCA staff report on the Warren Commission.
(248) Ibid., Darn. 114 and 115.
(249) See ref. 225, SSC, book V, p. 57.
(250) Id. at p. 31.
(251) Id. at p. 57.
(252) Ibid.
(253) Ibid.
(254) Id. at p. 38-59.
(255) Testimony of Richard M. Helms, September 22, 1978, IV HSOA-JFK hearings, 31.
(256) Ibid., p. 2021.
(257) See para. 259, HSCA staff report on the Warren Commission.
(258) Ibid., para. 256.
(259) See ref. 225, SSC, book V, pp. 57-60.
(260) See Data. 257, HSCA staff report on the Warren Commission.
(261) Ibid., Data. 115
(262) See ref. 255, Helms testimony, pp. 29-30.
(263) Ibid.
(264) Id. at p. 149.
(265) See para. 183-187 and 137, HSCA staff report on the Warren Commission.
(266) See CE 3045, Warren Commission report.
(267) See CE 3146, Warren Commission report.
(268) Warren report, p. 324.
(269) Executive session testimony of Leon Brown, House Select Committee
on Assassinations, p. 139 (JFK Doc. 008343).
(270) Id. at 138.
(271) Id. at 139.
(272) Ibid.
(273) Ibid.
(274) Id. at p. 141.
(275) Id. at p. 142.
(276) Id. at p. 144.
(277) Ibid.
(278) Id. at p. 143.
(279) Id. at p. 140.
(280) Id. at p. 144.
(281) Id. at p. 145.
(282) Ibid.
(283) See ref. 33, Liebeler executive session testimony, p. 133.
(284) Draft cover letter to a memorandum from Leon D. Hubert and Burt W. Griffin to Richard M. Helms, "Jack Ruby--Background, Friends, and Other Pertinent Information," Feb. 24, 1964 (JFK Doc. 001927).
(285) See ref. 284, attached routing slip.
(286) See ref. 37, Griffin executive session testimony, p. 37.
(287) CIA internal memorandum for the record on CIA meeting with Leon D. Hubert and Burt W. Griffin, Mar. 12. 1964.
(288) Letter from J. Lee Rankin to Richard M. Helms, May 19, 1964.
(289) Memorandum from Thomas H. Karamessines to J. Lee Rankin, Sept. 15, 1964.
(290) Letter from Burr W. Griffin to G. Robert Blakey, Nov. 23, 1978 (JFK :Doc. 003477 ).
(291) Ibid.
(292) Letter from J. Lee Rankin to John McCone, Director of Central Intelligence, Feb. 12, 1964.
(293) Internal memorandum, Central Intelligence Agency, Mar. 3, 1964.
(294) Memorandum from Howard P. Willens to 5. Lee Rankin, Mar. 9, 1964.
(295) Ibid.
(296) Memorandum for the record, Mar. 12, 1964; letter from Rankin to Helms. Mar. 16, 1964, see ref. 141.
(297) Memorandum from Samuel Stern to 5. Lee Rankin, Mar. 27, 1964.
(298) See Warren Commission Doc. 674, National Archives.
(299) Warren Commission hearings, 129.
(300) CIA internal memorandum, Nov. 25, 1963, CIA item 173A.
(301) CIA internal memorandum, May 12, 1964, CIA item 298.
(302) Memorandum from David Slawson to Howard P. Willens, Feb. 21. 1964.
(303) Memorandum from David Slawson to 5. Lee Rankin, Mar. 27, 1964.
(304) Ibid.
(305) See ref. 302.
(306) See ref. 34, Slawson executive session testimony, pp. 42-43.
(307) Ibid.
(308) Executive session testimony of Robert Gemberling, p. 85.
(309) Ibid.
(310) Id. at p. 86.
(311) Ibid.
(312) Id. at p. 93.
(313) Ibid.
(314) Id. at p. 104.
(315) Ibid.
(316) Id. at p. 132.
(317) Id. at p. 104.
(318) Ibid.
(319) Id. at p. 107.
(320) Ibid.
(321) Book V, Senate Intelligence Committee report, p. 70.
(322) Id. at p. 74.
(323) Ibid.
(324) Id. at p. 70.
(325) Ibid., pp. 67-68, 73.
(326) See para. 363, IlSCA staff report on the Warren Commission.
(327) Book V, Senate Intelligence Committee report, p. 71.
(328) Ibid.
(329) Id. at p. 72.
(330) Id. at p. 73.
(331) Id. at p. 74.
(332) See ref. 255, Helms testimony, pp. 151, 172.
(333) See ref. 255, Helms testimony, pp. 178-9.
(334) Id. at p. 183.
(335) Memorandum from David Slawson to ff. Lee Rankin, Sept. 6, 1964.
(336) See ref. 34, Slawson executive session testimony, p. 27.
(337) Ibid.
(338) Id. at p. 28.
(339) Ibid.
(340) Id. at p. 27.
(341) See ref. 25, Specter executive session testimony, p. 46.
(342) See ref. 25, Redlich executive session testimony, p. 132.
(343) See ref. 203, Rankin testimony, p. 91.
(344) See ref. 242, Katzenbach testimony, p. 23.
(345) Id. at p. 19.
(346) See ref. 203, Rankin testimony, p. 28.
(347) See ref. 242 Katzenbach testimony, p. 20.
(348) See ref. 33, Liebeler executive testimony, p. 171.
(349) See tel. 37, Griffin executive session testimony, pp. 38-61.
ANALYSIS OF THE SUPPORT PROVIDED TO THE WARREN COMMISSION BY THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY