XIII. 544 CAMP STREET AND RELATED EVENTS
Our work was primarily to gather food and clothing for the refugees. However because of my being known in connection with that,(and) my background being known with Arcacha Smith and others, I have had high-ranking Cuban refugees in my office asking me how to go underground, and I gave them diagrams for that. I have talked to military and political leaders from the various provinces of Cuba that have slipped out and slipped back. (66)
Submitted by:
GAETON J. FONZI,
Investigator.
PATRICIA M. ORR
Researcher.
REFERENCES
(1) Report of the President's Commission on the Assassination of President Kennedy (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1964), p.728 (hereinafter cited as the Warren Report).
(2) Ibid.
(3) Hearings before the President's Commission on the Assassination of President Kennedy (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1964), vol. XXVI, CE-2966 A and B (hereinafter cited as Warren Commission Hearings).
(4) Warren Report, p.728; Deposition of Carlos Bringuier, May 12, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations, pp.126-129 (J.F.K. Document 009084).
(5) Ibid.
(6) Warren Report, p.826.
(7) Ibid.
(8) XXVI, Warren Commission Hearings, p.30, CE-3120, Pamphlet, "The Crime Against Cuba," Corliss Lamont.
(9) Ibid., vol. XXVI, p.11, CE-3119, Secret Service Report, Nov. 30, 1963, CO-2-34,030.
(10) Ibid.; FBI teletype, FOIA materials, 62-109060-1668, Nov. 26, 1963, pp.1-3.
(11) XXVI, Warren Commission Hearings, CE-2966 A and B.
(12) Ibid., vol. XX, Lee DE-7.
(13) Ibid.
(14) Warren Report, p.408; XXII, Warren Commission Hearings, CE-1414; FBI teletype, FOIA materials, 62-109060-1668, Nov. 26, 1963, pp.1-3.
(15) Ibid.; XXII, Warren Commission Hearings, CE-1414.
(16) Ibid.
(17) Ibid.
(18) Ibid.
(19) Ibid.
(20) Ibid.; FBI teletype, FOIA materials, 62-109060-1668, Nov. 26, 1963, pp. 1-3.
(21) Warren Report, pp.292 and 408.
(22) Deposition of Sam Newman, Nov. 6, 1978,House Select Committee on Assassinations, p.21 (J.F.K. Document 014020).
(23) Ibid.
(24) Id. at p.5.
(25) Id. at p.22.
(26) XXII, Warren Commission Hearings, CE-1414, Secret Service Report, CO-2-34,030, pp.4-5.
(27) See ref. 22.
(28) Id. at pp.9,21.
(29) Id. at pp.23-24.
(30) Id. at p.13.
(31) Outside Contact Report with Attachment, Mrs. Anna Stewart, Apr. 11, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations (J.F.K. Document 007364).
(32) Ibid., attachments: Rosters through October 1962, April 1963 and March 1964.
(33) Ibid., roster through October 1962, p.14 (first list);roster through April 1963, p.16(second list).
(34) FBI teletype, FOIA material, 62-109060-1668, Nov. 26, 1963, p.9. 133
(35) Kerry Thornley affidavit, Jan. 8, 1976, p. 1, House Select Committee on Assassinations (J.F.K. Document 012740).(Note: This statement, while rambling and confusing, remains consistent on the major point that Thornley had no contact with Oswald after service in the Marines.)
(36) Ibid.; see also testimony of Kerry Thornley, May 18, 1964, XI, Warren Commission Hearings, pp.96-97.
(37) Outside Contact Report, Mrs. Anna Stewart, Apr. 11, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations, attachment roster through March 1964 (J.F.K. Document 007364).
(38) FBI teletype, FOIA material, 62-109060-1668, Nov. 26, 1963, p.9.
(39) Ibid.; Secret Service Report, Dec. 2, 1963, CO-2-34,030 (J.F.K. Document 003675): Thornley testimony, XI, Warren Commission Hearings, 110.
(40) Outside Contact Report, George S. Gay, Jan. 13, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations (J.F.K. Document 005191).
(41) XXII, Warren Commission Hearings, CE-1414, Secret Service Report, CO-2-34,030, Dec. 9, 1963, p.5.
(42) Outside Contact Report, George C. Gay, Jan. 13, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations (J.F.K. Document 005191).
(43) Ibid.; XXII, Warren Commission Hearings, CE-1414, Secret Service Report, CO-2-34,030, Dec. 9, 1963, p.5.
(44) See ref. 42.
(45) Ibid.
(46) Ibid.
(47) Outside Contact Report, George S. Gay, re: Eugenia Donnelly, June 6, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations (J.F.K. Document 009115).
(48) Outside Contact Report, Jack Mancuso, Jan. 26, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations (J.F.K. Document 014120).
(49) Ibid.
(50) Ibid.
(51) XXVI, Warren Commission Hearings, CE-3119, Secret Service Report, Nov. 30, 1963, CO-2-34,030, p.15.
(52) Ibid.
(53) Ibid.
(54) Outside Contact Report, re: James Arthus, June 1, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations (J.F.K. Document 009047).
(55) FBI Teletype, FOIA material, 62-109060-2668, Nov. 26, 1963, p.2.
(56) Material received from files of New Orleans district attorney's office pertaining to investigation and trial of Clay Shaw, 1967-69, attachment D, section 5, regarding Guy Banister, "Biographical Sketch" (J.F.K. Document 007271).
(57) Ibid.
(58) Ibid.
(59) Ibid.
(60) Ibid.: FAA materials, Systems Board of Adjustments Grievance Hearing of David Ferrie, testimony of Guy Banister, Aug. 5, 1963, p. 828 (J.F.K. Document No. 014904).
(61) See ref. 56.
(62) Staff review of FBI files for Guy Banister, Oct. 28, 1978, pp.1-2.
(63) CIA document.
(64) Staff review of FBI files for Guy Banister, Oct. 28, 1978, pp. 1-2. (Note: Coincidentally, Gerard F. Tujague, owner of Gerard F. Tujague, Inc. Forwarding Co., who had employed Oswald as a messenger from November 1955 to January 1956, was also a member and officer (vice-president of Friends of Democratic Cuba (see FBI teletype, 62-109060-1668, Jan. 26, 1963, p.5.)
(65) Ibid.
(66) See ref. 60, p.828.
(67) Staff review of FBI files for Guy Banister, Oct. 28, 1978, pp.1-2.
(68) Deposition of Sam Newman, Nov. 6, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations, p.22 (J.F.K. Document 014020).
(69) Staff report, "Anti-Castro Activist and Organizations and Lee Harvey Oswald in New Orleans," Appendix to the Hearings before the Select Committee on Assassinations, House of Representatives, 95th Congress, 2d session (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1979), vol. X, par. 419ff (here-inafter the Anti-Castro Cuban staff report).
(70) Ibid., pars. 402 and 418.
(71) FBI teletype, FOIA material, 62-109060-5237, May 7, 1967, pp.1-2. 134
(72) Outside Contact Report, Vernon Gerdes, Jan. 10, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations,p.3(J.F.K. Document No. 005208); see ref. 68, p. 49; Outside Contact Report, Jack Martin, Dec. 5, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations, p.6 (J.F.K. Document No. 005212).
(73) FBI teletype, FOIA material, 62-109060-5237, May 7, 1967, pp.1-2.
(74) See ref. 60, p.825.
(75) Ibid., p.481.
(76) Ibid.
(77) Ibid.
(78) Ibid., pp. 825-855.
(79) Outside Contact Report, Mary Helen Brengel, Apr. 6, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations (J.F.K. Document No. 008861); and ref. 69, Anti-Castro Cuban Staff Report, par. 439ff.
(80) Ibid., par. 390.
(81) Ibid., par. 390ff.
(82) Ibid., par. 392.
(83) Outside Contact Report, Ross Banister, Feb. 20, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations, p.3(J.F.K. Document No. 005967).
(84) Ibid.
(85) Ibid.
(86) Deposition of L E. "Bill" nitschke, July 31, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations, pp.5 and 12 (J.F.K. Document No. 012308).
(87) Id. at pp.12-14.
(88) Id. at pp.36-37.
(89) Ibid.
(90) Id. at pp.38-41.
(91) Ibid.
(92) Outside Contact Report, Delphine Roberts, July 6, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations,p.3 (J.F.K. Document No. 009979).
(93) See ref. 22, p.27.
(94) Id. at pp.35-36.
(95) Ibid.
(96) Id. at p.30.
(97) Outside contact report, Joseph Newbrough, Apr. 10, 1964, House Select Committee on Assassinations, p. 1 (J.F.K. Document No. 009113). Newbrough was associated with Banister's agency from approximately 1958 to 1964; Outside Contact Report, Vernon Gerdes, Jan. 10, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations (J.F.K. Document No. 005208). Gerdes was associated with Banister for the period 1960-63.
(98) Outside contact report, Mary Helen Brengel, Apr. 6, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations, p. 1 (J.F.K. Document No. 008861).
(99) Notes of an interview of Louise Decker, May 30, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations (J.F.K. Document 015045).
(100) Outside contact report, Joseph Oster, Jan. 27, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations (J.F.K. Document 005207).
(101) Deposition of Carlos Quiroga, May 23, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations, pp.21-27 (J.F.K. Document 009394).
(102) Id. at pp. 50, 51, and 57.
(103) Ibid.
(104) See ref. 22, p.31. Newman recommended the committee speak with Martin because he was in Banister's office "90 percent of the time; every day almost" and he "kept up with all that stuff" related to the Cubans. See also ref. 86. pp.59-60. Nitschke told the committee, "* * * If you were trying to explore this to the fullest extent, I would say that Delphine (Roberts) would be No. 1 * * *."
(105) Outside contact report, Delphine Roberts, July 6, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations, p. 1 (J.F.K. Document 009979).
(106) Id. at p.3.
(107) Ibid.
(108) Ibid.
(109) Ibid.
(110) Ibid.
(111) Ibid.
(112) Ibid.
(113) Ibid.
(114) See ref. 105, p. 3.
(115) Ibid.
(116) Guy Banister file, Garrison papers, Aug. 14, 1977, item GB-2, "Report of Offense Against Persons," Nov. 22, 1963, New Orleans Police Department (J.F.K. Document 002066). The report indicates the incident took place at 5:15 p.m. and was classified as "aggravated battery"; the motive was "sudden anger."
(117) Ibid.
(118) Ibid.
(119) Ibid.
(120) Ibid.
(121) Ibid.
(122) Ibid.
(123) Ibid.
(124) Outside contact report, Jack Martin, Dec.5, 1977, House Select Committee on Assassinations,p. 1 (J.F.K. Document 005212).
(125) See ref. 86, pp.9-16.
(126) See ref. 124, p.3.
(127) Id. at p.4.
(128) Ibid.
(129) Ibid.
(130) FBI interviews of Jack Martin, Nov. 25, 1963 and Nov. 27, 1963, Bureau file No.89-69.
(131) FBI interview of G. Wray Gill, Nov. 27, 1963, Bureau file No.89-69, p.2.
(132) FBI interview of David Ferrie, Nov. 26, 1963, Bureau file No.89-69, p.9.
(133) See ref. 124, p. 1; FBI interview of G. Wray Gill, Nov. 27, 1963, Bureau file No.89-69, p. 2; and FBI interview of David Ferrie, Nov. 26, 1963, Bureau file No.89-69, p. 9. See also FAA Systems Board of Adjustment Grievance hearings for David Ferrie, July 15-17 and Aug. 5, 1963, for more discussion of Ferrie's and Martin's involvement in unusual religious orders.
(134) FBI interview of David Ferrie, Nov. 26, 1963, Bureau file No.89-69, p.9.
(135) FBI interview of G. Wray Gill, Nov. 27, 1963, Bureau file No.89-69, p.2.
(136) Ibid.
(137) See ref. 124, p.2.
(138) Ibid.; see also FBI interviews of Jack Martin, Nov. 25, 1963 and Nov. 27, 1963; Secret Service interview of Jack Martin, Nov. 29, 1963, reported in report of Dec. 13, 1963, p.5. Martin makes no mention of the alleged sighting of Oswald and Ferie together.
(139) Outside contact report, Mary Banister Wilson, Apr. 7, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations (J.F.K. Document 012448).
(140) Ibid.
(141) Ibid.
(142) Outside contact report, Kent Courtney, Mar. 19, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations (J.F.K. Document 006676).
(143) See ref. 139.
(144) Outside contact report, Russell R. Willie, June 8, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations (J.F.K. Document 009262); outside contact report, Joseph Cambre, June 8, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations (J.F.K. Document 009263).
(145) Ibid., outside contact report, Willie.
(146) Ibid.
(147) Ibid.
(148) Outside contact report, Joseph Cambre, June 8, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations (J.F.K. Document No. 009263).
(149) Ibid.
(150) Ibid.
(151) Ibid.
(152) Outside contact report, Aaron Kohn, Jan. 20, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations (J.F.K. Document No. 005121).
(153) Ibid.
(154) Guy Banister file, Garrison papers, Aug. 14, 1977, item GB-1, index of Banister file (J.F.K. Document No. 002066).
(155) See ref. 148.
(156) Guy Banister file, Garrison papers, Aug. 14, 1977, item GB-1, index of Banister file (J.F.K. Document No. 002066).
(157) FBI interview of David Ferrie, Nov. 26, 1963 and Nov. 27, 1963, Bureau file No.89-69, p. 10.
Submitted by:
GAETON J. FONZI,
Investigator.
ELIZABETH J. PALMER,
Researcher.
REFERENCES
(1) CIA Cable to Director from MASH, Nov. 17, 1960.
(2) FBI Manolo Ray references, section 2, p.9, item 8 (J.F.K. Document 006468).
(3) Ibid.
(4) Memo to G. Robert Blakey, June 28, 1978, interview of Manolo Ray Rivero, House Select Committee on Assassinations (J.F.K. Document 009005).
(5) Ibid.
(6) E. Howard Hunt, Give Us This Day (New York: Popular Library Edition, 1963),p. 91 (hereinafter Hunt, Day).
(7) FBI correlation study, Manolo Ray, file No.97-4546, section 1, p. 2 (J.F.K. Document 005990).
(8) CIA memo, July 16, 1962.
(9) CIA report, Mar. 16, 1961.
(10) See ref. 6, Hunt, Day, p.92.
(11) See ref. 4.
(12) CIA document, June 9, 1962.
(13) CIA document, Nov. 17, 1960.
(14) Ibid.
(15) CIA document.
(16) See ref. 6, Hunt, Day, p.92.
(17) Tad Szulc, "Castro Foes Map Multiple Forays," Apr. 10, 1961, New York Times.
(18) Ibid.
(19) Ibid.
(20) See ref.6, Hunt, Day, p.92.
(21) CIA report, Oct. 17, 1960.
(22) CIA memo, Sept. 27, 1960.
(23) CIA cable from MASH, Sept. 29, 1960.
(24) CIA memo, Sept. 7, 1960.
(25) Ibid.
(26) CIA cable to Director from MASH, Nov. 5, 1960.
(27) CIA cable to Director from MASH, Nov. 11, 1960.
(28) CIA memo for the record, Nov. 21, 1960.
(29) CIA cable to Director from MASH, Nov. 17, 1960.
(30) CIA memo for the record, June 2, 1961.
(31) CIA information report, Dec. 22, 1960.
(32) CIA memo, Mar. 16, 1961.
(33) CIA cable from JM/WAVE, Mar. 1, 1961.
(34) CIA cable to Director from MASH, Nov. 17, 1960.
(35) See ref.6, Hunt, Day, pp.172-173.
(36) CIA administrative form.
(37) See ref. 4.
(38) CIA memo for the record, Mar. 27, 1961.
(39) See ref. 4.
(40) Sam Pope Brewer, "One Cuban Group Quits Exile Body," May 28, 1961, New York Times.
(41) Ibid.
(42) Ibid.
(43) CIA memo for the record, June 2, 1961.
(44) CIA cable from JM/WAVE, Apr. 29, 1961.
(45) Ibid.
(46) Ibid.
(47) CIA cable from JM/WAVE, May 4, 1961.
(48) CIA memo, May 5, 1961.
(49) CIA memo, June 2, 1961.
(50) CIA memo, Dec. 19, 1961.
(51) Peter Kihss, "Cuba Exile Group Criticizes CIA," July 17, 1961, New York Times.
(52) Ibid.
(53) CIA memo, Oct. 10, 1961.
(54) CIA cable to Director, July 2, 1962.
(55) CIA memo, Dec. 19, 1961.
(56) CIA document, Apr. 20, 1962.
(57) CIA memo, July 25, 1962.
(58) CIA memo, July 12, 1962.
(59) CIA cable to Director, July 25, 1962.
(60) CIA memo, July 12, 1962.
(61) CIA cable, July 25, 1962.
(62) Ibid.
(63) CIA cable to Director, June 19, 1963.
(64) CIA dispatch, July 2, 1963.
(65) CIA memo, July 9, 1964.
(66) CIA memo, Aug. 23, 1963.
(67) See ref. 4.
(68) CIA cable to Director from JM/WAVE, Sept. 11, 1963.
(69) CIA draft, Oct. 4, 1963.
(70) CIA cable to Chief, Oct. 22, 1963.
(71) See ref. 4.
(72) CIA cable to Director from JM/WAVE, Jan. 14, 1964.
(73) CIA cable, Feb. 4, 1964.
(74) CIA cable to Director from JM/WAVE, Mar. 28, 1964.
(75) CIA memo, Apr. 14, 1964.
(76) "The Hemisphere-Cuba," Time, June 12, 1964, p.48.
(77) Ibid.
(78) Ibid.
(79) Ibid.
(80) CIA cable to Director from JM/WAVE, May 20, 1964; cable to Director from JM/WAVE, June 3, 1964.
(81) See ref. 76.
(82) Ibid.
(83) Ibid.
(84) Ibid.
(85) Ibid.
(86) Ibid.
(87) CIA memo, May 20, 1964.
(88) Ibid.
(89) Ibid.
(90) CIA memo, June 29, 1964.
(91) CIA cable to Director, July 15, 1964.
(92) CIA wire service printout, Miami, Fla., July 24, 1964.
(93) CIA memo, June 29, 1964.
(94) CIA, "Autonomous Operations--Operating Plan."
(95) CIA memo, draft, Sept. 22, 1964.
(96) CIA cable, June 4, 1969.
(97) Ibid.
(98) See ref. 4.
(99) Ibid.
(100) Ibid.
XV. ADDENDUM TO THE JUNTA DEL GOBIERNO DE CUBA EN EL EXILIO:CARLOS RODRIGUEZ QUESADA
Submitted by:
GAETON J. FONZI
Investigator.
PATRICIA M. ORR
Researcher.
REFERENCES
(1) Staff summary of the CIA handbook (hereinafter handbook summary); see also staff summary of CIA file, p. 1(ref. memo, May 19,1962) (hereinafter CIA-Quesada).
(2) See ref. 1, handbook summary.
(3) See ref. 1, CIA-Quesada, p. 1.
(4) Ibid.
(5) Id. at p.3 (ref. Jan. 18, 1961, memo).
(6) See ref. 1, handbook summary.
(7) Ibid.
(8) Ibid., see also staff summary of FBI file for Carlos Rodriguez Quesada, p.5 (ref.105-107224-16, Mar. 15, 1962, Miami) (hereinafter FBI-Quesada).
(9) See ref. 1, CIA-Quesada, p.3 (ref. Jan. 18, 1961, memo).
(10) Id. at p. 1.
(11) Ibid.
(12) Ibid.
(13) Ibid.
(14) See ref. 8, FBI-Quesada, p.7 (ref.105-107224-16, Mar. 15, 1962, Miami).
(15) Ibid.
(15a) Id. at p.6 (ref.109-584-3414, Feb. 14,1963, and 97-4133-60, Apr. 30, 1963).
(16) Id. at p. 7 (ref.105-107224-16, Mar. 15, 1962, Miami); see also ref.1, handbook summary.
(17) Id. at p.4 (ref.105-107224-A., Mar. 19, 1962) and p.8 (ref. 105-92196-24, Mar. 15, 1962).
(18) Id. at p.1 (ref.109-584-3102, Miami, Mar. 15, 1962).
(19) Ibid.
(20) Ibid.
(21) Id. at p.4 (ref. 109-584-3183, May 28, 1963, Miami).
(22) See ref. 1, handbook summary.
(23) Ibid.
(24) Ibid.
(25) See ref. 8, FBI-Quesada, p.8 (ref.105-92196-30, Apr. 16, 1962).
(26) Ibid.
(27) Id. at p.7 (ref.105-92196-70, Apr. 12, 1963).
(28) Ibid.
(29) See ref. 1, handbook summary.
(30) Ibid.
(31) See ref. 1, CIA-Quesada, p. 1.
(32) Ibid.
(33) See re. 1, handbook summary.
(34) Ibid.
(35) See ref. 8, FBI-Quesada, p. 4 (ref.105-137256-4, Apr. 21, 1964).
(36) Staff summary of FBI file for Paulino Sierra Martinez, House Select Committee on Assassinations, p. 7, memo, Feb. 28, 1961, re JGCE.
THE EVOLUTION AND IMPLICATIONS OF THE CIA SPONSORED ASSASSINATION CONSPIRACIES AGAINST FIDEL CASTRO
CONTENTS
II. BACKGROUND MATERIAL-RELEVANT SUMMARY
A. CIA-MAFIA PLOTS
B. LAS VEGAS WIRETAP INCIDENT
To: Attorney General
From: Director, FBI[Attorney General Robert Kennedy] indicated that a few days prior to [5-9-62] he had been advised by the CIA that Robert A. Maheu had been hired by the CIA to approach Sam Giancana with a proposition of paying $150,000 to hire gunmen to go into Cuba and kill Castro. He further stated CIA admitted having assisted Maheu in making the "bugging" installation in Las Vegas which uncovered this clandestine operation and for this reason CIA could not afford to have any action taken against Giancana or Maheu.
Mr. Kennedy stated that upon learning CIA had not cleared its action in hiring Maheu and Giancana with the Department of Justice, he issued orders that the CIA should never again take such steps without first checking with the Department of Justice.
Mr. Kennedy further advised that because of this matter it would be very difficult to initiate any prosecution against Giancana, as Giancana could immediately bring out the fact the U.S. Government had approached him to arrange for the assassination of Castro. He stated the same was true concerning any action we might take against Maheu for any violation in which he might become involved.
C. ROBERT MAHEU AND THE LONG COMMITTEE
D. EFFORTS OF JOHN ROSELLI TO AVOID PROSECUTION
E. DEBUT OF THE RETALIATION THEORY
F. CIA 1967 INSPECTOR GENERAL'S REPORT
G. ANDERSON ARTICLES
H. ROSELLI DEPORTATION
I. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
J. CIA 1977 TASK FORCE REPORT
1. Syndicate operations
It is possible that CIA simply found itself involved in providing additional resources for independent operations that the syndicate already had underway * * *[I]n a sense CIA may have been piggybacking on the syndicate and in addition to its material contribution was also supplying an aura of official sanction. (84)
2. AMLASH
AMLASH still feels there only two ways accomplish change either inside job or invasion he realistic enough to realize latter out of question. According AMWHIP, AMLASH still awaiting for U.S. reveal plan of action. (92)
The T.F. Report noted that the SSC interpreted "inside job" as referring to an operation against Castro; the CIA, however, said it referred to a general commitment concerning how to effect change.(93) The T.F. Report also stated that at this point Book V said "characterization of this phase of the AMLASH operation is disputed."(94) The CIA contended that any dispute exists only in the eyes of the SSC.(95)
Whatever the relationship with AMLASH/1 following the death of President Kennedy, there is every indication that during President Kennedy's life AMLASH/1 had no basis for believing that he had CIA support for much of any- thing. Were he a provocateur reporting to Castro, or if he was merely careless and leaked what he knew, he had no factual basis for leaking or reporting any actual CIA plot directed against Castro. (106)
While one can understand today why the Warren Commis- sion limited its inquiry to normal avenues of investigation, it would have served to reinforce the credibility of its effort had it taken a broader view of the matter. CIA, too, could have considered in specific terms what most saw in general terms the possibility of Soviet or Cuban involvement in the assassination of (J.F.K.) because of tensions of the time. . . The Agency should have taken broader initiatives, then, as well. (107)
K. RECENT ANDERSON ARTICLES
Mafia mobster John Roselli may have taken the secret of the John F. Kennedy assassination with him to his death. He was brutally murdered a few weeks ago, his hacked up body stuffed into an oil drum and dumped into Miami's Biscayne Bay.
Before he died, Roselli hinted to associates that he knew who had arranged President Kennedy's murder. It was the same conspirators he suggest, whom he had recruited earlier to kill Cuban Premier Fidel Castro.
By Roselli's cryptic account, Castro learned the identity of the underworld contacts in Havana who had been tying to knock him off. He believed, not altogether without basis, that President Kennedy was behind the plot. The Cuban leader, as the supreme irony, decided to turn the tables and use the same crowd to arrange Kennedy's assassination according to Roselli's scenario.
To save their skins, the plotters lined up Lee Harvey Oswald to pull the trigger. Roselli could never be pinned down on names or details. It was also difficult to assess whether he knew what he was talking about or whether he merely described what he thought might have happened. Certainly there is no real evidence to support Roselli's story. But there are enough curious circumstances to justify telling it. here are the fascinating highlights.
The ruggedly handsome Roselli, a flamboyant mobster with underworld contacts in Havana, was recruited by the Central Intelligence Agency in 1960 to assassinate Castro. He had no authority, however, over the underworld elements in Havana. They were under the loose control of Florida's Mafia chieftain, Santos Trafficante.
His gambling enterprises in Havana had been closed down by Castro after the 1959 revolution. In fact, Trafficante had been lodged for a period in a Cuban jail, an indignity that didn't endear Castro to him. After Trafficante made it back to his Florida haunts, he left part of his organization behind in Havana. Some of his henchmen even managed to develop contacts in Castro's inner circle.
These were the people Roselli wanted to use to knock off Castro. But Roselli didn't have the stature inside the Mafia to make the necessary arragements with Trafficante. So Roselli called in his patron, The Chicago godfather Sam (Momo) Giancana, to deal with Trafficante. As Roselli's associates tell it, he persuaded Giancana that it would be to their advantage to win the good will of the CIA.
Convinced, Giancana flew down to Florida to make the preliminary arragements. Once Giancana and Trafficante set it up, Roselli used the Havana underworld to plot Castro's demise.
At first, they tried to plant poison pills, supplied by the CIA, in Castro's food. The pills would have made it appear that he died of natural causes. When this failed, snipers were dispatched to a Havana rooftop. They were caught. The word reached Roselli that some of the plotters had been tortured and that Castro had learned about the whole operation.
The CIA called off the Roselli operation in March 1963, but recruited a Castro associated, Rolando Cubela, to murder Castro. In an impromptu, 3-hour interview with Associated Press reporter Daniel Harker, Castro indicated that he knew about the attempts on his life and warned that U.S. leaders also might not be safe.
That was September 7, 1963. According to Roselli, Castro enlisted the same underworld elements whom he had caught plotting against him. They supposedly were Cubans from the old Trafficante organization. Working with Cuban intelligence, they allegedly lined up an ex-Marine sharpshooter, Lee Harvey oswald, who had been active in the pro-Castro movement.
According to Roselli's version, Oswald may have shot Kennedy or may have acted as a decoy while others ambushed him from closer range. When Oswald was picked up, Roselli suggested, the underworld conspirators feared he would crack and disclose information that might lead to them. This almost certainly would have brought a massive U.S. crackdown on the Mafia. So Jack Ruby was ordered to eliminiate Oswald, making it appear as an act of reprisal against the President's killer.
At least this is how Roselli explained the tragedy in Dallas. Several key CIA officials believed that Castro was behind the Kennedy assassination. It has also been established that Jack Ruby, indeed, had been in Cuba and had connections in the Havana underworld. One CIA cable, dated November 28, 1963, reported that "an American gangster type named Ruby" had visited Trafficante in his Cuban prison.
A. PREFACE
B. AMLASH OPERATION
1. Characterization of the AMLASH operation
[T]he AMLASH operation prior to the assassination of President Kennedy was characterized by the special affairs staff, Desmond Fitzgerald (sic) and other senior CIA officers as an assassination operation initiated and sponsored by the CIA. (115)
To the best of my knowledge, Mr. FitzGerald considered the AMLASH operation to be a political action activity with the objection of organizing a group under AMLASH/1 to overthrow Castro and the Castro regime by means of a coup d' etat. I heard Mr. FitzGerald discuss the AMLASH operation frequently, and never heard him characterize it as an assassination operation. Mr. FitzGerald stated within my hearing on several occasions his awareness that coup d'etat often involves loss of live. (118)
Desmond FitzGerald did not characterize the AMLASH operation as an "assassination operation"; the case officer did not; I, as Executive Officer did not, never discussed any aspect of the AMLASH operation with Joseph H. Langosch; the deputy chief, the other branch chiefs and the special assistants could not have so characterized it since they did not know about the pen (the pen was specially filled with a hypodermic syringe in response to urgings by AMLASH for a means to start the coup by killing Castro.) The case officer offered the pen to AMLASH on the day of President Kennedy's death. AMLASH rejected the pen with disdain. (119)
2. The probability that Castro would have assassinated the President of the United States
That was insane. From the ideological point of view it was insane. And from the political point of view, it was a tremen- dous insanity. I am going to tell you here that nobody, nobody ever had the idea of such things. What would it do? We just tried to defend our folks here, within our territory. Anyone who subscribed to that idea would have been judged insane . . . absolutely sick. Never, in 20 years of revolution, I never heard anyone suggest nor even speculate about a measure of that sort, because who could think of the idea of organizing the death of the President of the United States. That would have been the most perfect pretext for the United States to invade our country which is what I have tried to prevent for all these years, in every possible sense. Since the United States is much more powerful than we are, what could we gain from a war with the United States? The United States would lose nothing. The destruction would have been here. (120)
I want to tell you that the death of the leader does not change the system. It has never done that. (121)
So, I said something like those plots start to set a very bad precedent. A very serious one-that that could become a boomerang against the authors of those actions * * * but I did not mean to threaten by that. I did not mean even that * * * not in the least * * * but rather, like a warning that we knew; that we had news about it; and that to set those precedents of plotting the assassination of leaders of other countries would be a very bad precedent * * * something very negative. And, if at present, the same would happen under the same circumstances, I would have no doubt in saying the same as I said (then) because I didn't mean a threat by that. I didn't say it as a threat. I did not mean by that that we were going to take measures-similar meas- ures-like a retaliation for that. We never meant that because we knew that there were plots. For 3 years we had known there were plots against us. So, the conversation came about very casually, you know; but I would say that all these plots or attempts were part of the everyday life. (122)
3. Summary
C. CIA-ORGANIZED CRIME PLOTS
1. SCOPE AND NATURE OF PLOTS
(a) Roselli knowledge of CIA sponsorship
(b) Discovery of true identities
(C) Roles of Principals
(1) Phase 1
Trafficante approached [this Cuban] and told him that he had clients who wanted to do away with Castro and that they would pay big money for the job. [The Cuban] is reported tohave been very receptive, since it would mean that he would be able to buy his own ships, arms, and communications equipent. (156)
(2) Phase 2
Trafficante was one of the principals in Shef Edwards phase 1 of the operation. He presumably was not involved in phase 2 under Harvey, but we cannot be sure of that. After all, Trafficante was the man who brought the Cuban exile leader into the operation late in phase 1, and the Cuban exile leader was one of the main players during phase 2. (170)
(d) Delivery of the pills
I also understand that there was a question of poison pills which were supposed to be transported to Havana. There was never any evidence they were transported there or ever left the United States. There was never any evidence that the plot ever left the Florida mainland, and if it was indeed an assassination plot, it was misadvertised to me because I had understood it was an effort to see if a connection could be made between the Mafia in Florida and the Mafia in Havana. As to the best of my knowledge, the connection never was made. (175)
(e) Location of Trafficante
(f) Cuban exile leader's other contacts
(g) Introduction of "Joe" and "Gold" and related events
During a recent conversation with several friends, Giancana stated that Fidel Castro was to be done away with shortly, said it would occur in November. Moreover, Giancana said he had already met with the would-be assassin on three occasions, the last meeting taking place on a boat docked at the Fontainbleu Hotel, Miami Beach. Giancana stated everything had been perfected for killing Castro and that the assassin had arranged with a girl, not further described, to drop a "pill" in some drink or food of Castro. (189)
(h) Richard Cain
(i) The "girl" in the October 18,1960, FBI memorandum
(j) articles on Frank Sturgis
(k) Implications arising from phase 2
2. MOTIVATION OF ORGANIZED CRIME TO BE INVOLVED IN THE PLOTS
* * *until we reached the point where it appeared it might come to fruition or had a chance to assess the individuals involved and determine exactly the problem wefaced, including the possible problem-and it was a very, or it appeared to be, and in my opinion was, at that time, a very real possibility of this Government being blackmailed either by Cubans (exiles) for political purposes or by figuresin organized crime for their own self-protection or aggrandizement, which as it turned out, did not happen, but at that time was a very pregnant possibility. (227)
3. RETALIATION THEORY
(a) Results of the committee's investigation
(b) Propoenent of the retaliation theory
(c) Summary
4. RELATED ORGANIZED CRIME ACTIVITIES
(a) Norman Rothman
One of them happened to discuss (the assassination of Castro) with me, but not in a technical way. You know, just in a casual way. That is about it. I cannot for the moment remember it word for word because it is too far back. (258)
(b) Name links between the AMLASH and the CIA-organized crime operations
Link 1
(2) Link 2
(3) Link 3
5. DEATHS OF ROSELLI AND GIANCANA
6. CIA ACTIONS IN CONCEALING THE REACTIVATION AND CONTINUATION OF THE ASSASSINATION PLOTS FROM ATTORNEY GENERAL ROBERT F. KENNEDY
The Attorney General was not told that the gambling syndicate (assassination) operation had already been reactivated, nor, as far as we know, was he ever told that CIA had a continuing involvement with U.S. gangster elements. (274)
The gambling syndicate operation had been taken from him, and, in retrospect, he probably acted properly in briefing the Attorney General on only that aspect of the operation for which he had been responsible and of which he had direct, personal knowledge. (281)
Submitted by:
T. MARK FLANAGAN, Jr.,
Researcher.
REFERENCES
(1) The Investigation of the Assassination of President John F. Kennedy: Performance of the Intelligence Agencies, book V, Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations, April 23, 1976, p.2. Senate No.94-755 (hereinafter cited as Book V).
(2) The complete details of the AMLASH and CIA-organized crime plots can be reviewed in book V and Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders, Interim Report, Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations, November 20, 1975, Senate Report No.94-465 (hereinafter cited as interim report).
(3) 1967 Report of the Inspector General, Central Intelligence Agency, p.14
(hereinafter cited as I.G. Report); Interim Report at p.74.
(4) See generally, I.G. Report
(5) Id. at pp. 3, 14.
(6) Id. at p. 3.
(7) Id. at p. 15.
(8) Ibid.
(9) Ibid.
(10) Ibid., p. 16. There is some disagreement between Robert Maheu and the Support Chief over who suggested that Roselli be contacted; each believes the other did. In any event, Maheu initiated the contact with Roselli.
(11) Id. at p. 19.
(12) Ibid.
(13) Id. at p. 20.
(14) Id. at p. 25.
(15) Id. at p. 27.
(16) Ibid.
(17) Ibid.
(18) Id. at p. 28.
(19) Id. at p. 29.
(20) Id. at p. 31.
(21) Id. at p. 32.
(22) The CIA contends that the plots were dormant after the Bay of Pigs
(see fn. 6). The possibility exists, however, that the plots were an on-going operation.
(23) I.G. Report, p. 39.
(24) Interim Report, p. 83.
(25) I.G. Report, p. 48.
(26) Id. at pp.47,49.
(27) Id. at p. 49.
(28) Id. at p. 51.
(29) Ibid.
(30) Id. at p. 52.
(31) Interim Report, p. 77.
(32) Interim Report, pp. 78-79.
(33) FBI memorandum to Sullivan from Wannall, "CIA's Intention to Send Hoodlums to Cuba to Assassinate Castro," March 6, 1967.
(34) FBI blank letterhead memorandum to the Attorney General from the Director, FBI, March 6, 1967.
(35) Interim Report, p. 79.
(36) Interview with Edward Pierpont morgan, HSCA, June 22, 1978, p. 1
(JFK document No. 009530).
(37) Ibid.
(38) Ibid.
(39) Interim Report, footnote 4, at p. 85.
(40) Ibid.
(41) Ibid.
(42) Ibid.
(43) Ibid.
(44) Ibid. See also Deposition of Robert Maheu, August 8, 1978, HSCA, p. 30 (J.F.K. document No. 012926), in which Maheu discusses the issue of Roselli using Agency connections as assistance in court proceedings. Maheu stated that Roselli's attorney called him to ask him to participate in a statement to be submitted in the Friar's Club case regarding Roselli's involvement in the CIA-organized crime plots.
(45) Book V, p.14.
(46) Ibid.
(47) See fn.36, Interview of Morgan, p.3. 190
(48) Book V, p. 80.
(49) See fn. 36, Interview of Morgan, p.2.
(50) Id. at p.3.
(51) Book V, p.82.
(52) Ibid. The I.G. Report noted in reference to the release of these plots that: Pearson's "ultimate source," Roselli, knows more about certain details of the gambling syndicate operation than we do, and he evidently has talked (I.G. Report, p.126).
(53) FBI airtel, to Director, FBI, from SAC Washington Field Office, March 21, 1967, FBI document No.62-109060-4839.
(54) Ibid., p. 3.
(55) Ibid. It should be noted that during this time, march 1967, Roselli met with Jim Garrison in Las Vegas. Garrison, of course, was then in the midst of his highly publicized trial into the death of President Kennedy. The I.G. Report stated: The Roselli-Garrison contact in Las Vegas in March is particularly disturbing (I.G. Report, p.127).
(56) Book V, pp.6,85,86.
(57) Id. at pp.85-86.
(58) I.G. Report, pp.101-103.
(59) Id. at p. 103.
(60) Id. at p. 104.
(61) The Washington Post, Jan. 18, 1971, section B, p.7; Jan. 19, 1971, section D,p.15.
(62) Interim Report, footnote 4, at p.85.
(63) Ibid.
(64) Book V, p. 1.
(65) Id. at p.68.
(66) Ibid.
(67) Id. at p.5.
(68) Id. at p.2.
(69) Ibid.
(70) 1977 Task Force Report, Central Intelligence Agency, pp.1,2 (hereinafter cited as T.F. Report).
(71) Ibid., tab A, at pp.1-2.
(72) Paul Meskill, New York Daily News, Apr. 20, 1975.
(73) Paul Meskill, New York Daily News, Apr. 21, 1975.
(74) Paul Meskill, New York Daily News, Apr. 21, 1975 and Apr. 23, 1975.
(75) Paul Meskill, New York Daily News, June 13, 1976.
(76) Book V, p.80.
(77) T.F. Report, tab C,p.15.
(78) Ibid., tab C, p. 17.
(79) Id. at p. 19.
(80) Id. at p. 18.
(
(81) T.F. Report, at tab C, p. 19.
(82) Id. at p. 20.
(83) Ibid.
(84) Ibid.
(85) T.F. Report, tab D, p. 1.
(86) Ibid.
(87) Id. at pp. 1, 2.
(88) Ibid.
(89) Id. at p. 5.
(90) Ibid.
(91) Ibid.
(92) Id. at p. 8.
(93) Id. at p. 8.
(94) Ibid.
(95) Ibid.
(96) Id. at p. 9.
(97) Ibid.
(98) Ibid.
(99) Id. at p. 10.
(100) Id. at p. 11.
(101) Id. at p. 13.
(102) Id. at p. 14.
(103) Id. at p. 15.
(104) Id. at p. 16.
(105) Ibid.
(106) Ibid.
(107) T. F. Report, p. 10.
(108) Jack Anderson and Les Whitten, "Behind John F. Kennedy's Murder," The Washington Post, Sept. 7, 1976; "CIA Withheld Data in J.F.K. Probe," The Washington Post, Sept. 9, 1976; "Roselli Points From His Grave," The Washington Post, Oct. 23, 1978; "The Story Behind Trafficante's Testimony on J.F.K. Assassination," The Washington Post, Oct. 2, 1978.
(109) For this reason information previously footnoted in this report which is used in the following analysis may not be cited again.
(110) Executive session testimony of Richard Helms, Aug. 9, 1978, hearings before the house Select Committee on Assassinations,pp.26-27.
(111) See reference No. 106.
(112) Affidavit of Joseph Langosch, Sept. 14, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations, p. 1.
(113) Book V, pp. 3, 8, 79.
(114) Ibid.
(115) Affidavit of Joseph Langosch, Sept. 14, 1978, p.4.
(116) Ibid.
(117) Affidavit of Kent L Pollock, Oct. 5, 1978 House Select Committee on Assassinations, p. 1.
(118) Ibid., par. 3, p. 2.
(119) Ibid., par. 4, p. 2.
(120) Interview of Fidel Castro Ruz, House Select Committee on Assassinations, Apr. 3, 1978, pp.38,39 (J.F.K. Document No. 011776).
(121) Id. at p.40.
(122) Id. at pp.2,3.
(123) Interim Report, p.173.
(124) Id. at p. 174.
(125) Ibid.
(126) Ibid.
(127) Ibid.; see in particular p.76.
(128) Interim Report, p.76; fn.1.
(129) Deposition of Robert Maheu, House Select Committee on Assassinations, Aug. 8, 1978, p.18 (J.F.K. Document No. 012926).
(130) Immunized testimony of Santos Trafficante, Sept. 28, 1978, hearing before House Select Committee on Assassinations, 95th Congress, 2d Session
(Washington, D.C.; U.S. Government Printing Office, 1979), volume V, p.361.
(131) Affidavit of the Support Chief, House Select Committee on Assassinations, Sept. 25, 1978, pp. 7, 8.
(132) Id. at p. 8.
(133) Ibid.
(134) I.G. Report at p. 19.
(135) Deposition of Robert Maheu, Aug. 8, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations, p. 17 (J.F.K. Document No. 012926).
(136) Interim Report, p. 77.
(137) Ibid., footnote 1, p. 77.
(138) Jack Anderson, "The Untold Story: Our Government's Crackdown on Organized Crime," The Washington Post, Parade magazine, Jan. 21, 1962.
(139) Such a distinction is invailid: the action of dealing with any criminal sources in a plot to kill is reprehensible enough.
(140) Interim Report, p.74.
(141) Id. at p.74.
(142) Ibid.
(143) Affidavit of the Support Chief, House Select Committee on Assas-sinations, Sept. 25, 1978, p.12.
(144) Ibid.
(145) Both Maheu and the Support Chief attribute each other with suggesting that John Roselli be recruited. See Interim Report, p.75.
(146) Interim Report, p.75.
(147) Interim Report, p.77.
(148) Ibid.
(149) Interview of Joseph Shimon, House Select Committee on Assassinations, Aug. 17, 1978, p.4 (J.F.K. document No. 013889). See also Interview of Joseph Shimon, British Broadcasting Corporation, Dec. 19, 1977, p.6. 192
(150) See footnote 149: Interview of Joseph Shimon, House Select Committee on Assassinations, p.4; BBC Interview, p.2.
(151) This contention refers only to the CIA-organized crime plots and not to any independent operation that Giancana may have been involved in.
(152) I.G. Report, p.25.
(153) Id. at p.27.
(154) Id. at p.29.
(155) Ibid.
(156) Id. at p.31.
(157) See ref. 130,immunized testimony of Santos Trafficante, Sept. 28, 1978, volume V, p.361.
(158) Id. at p.365.
(159) Id. at p.363.
(160) Id. at p.365.
(161) Testimony of John Roselli, Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations, June 24, 1975,p.20.
(162) Affidavit of the Support Chief, Sept. 25, 1978, p.17.
(163) I.G. Report, p.19.
(164) Support Chief, p.17.
(165) Executive session testimony of Cuban exile leader, hearings before House Select Committee on Assassinations, Mar. 16, 1978, p.58.
(166) I.G. Report, p.43.
(167) Id. at p.48.
(168) Ibid.
(169) Ibid.
(170) Id. at p.49.
(171) Id. at p.27.
(172) Interview of Joseph Shimon, House Select Committee on Assassinations, p.3 (J.F.K. Document 013889).
(173) Ibid.
(174) Ibid.
(175) See reference 110, Testimony of Richard Helms, volume IV, pp.5-250.
(176) I.G. Report, p.19.
(177) See file on Santos Trafficante at the Department of State.
(178) See ref. 130, Immunized Testimony of Santos Trafficante, volume V.
(179) I.G. Report, p.29.
(180) See ref. 165, executive session testimony of Cuban exile leader, hearings before House Select Committee on Assassinations, Mar. 16, 1978, pp. 7,10.
(181) Id. at p.10.
(182) I.G. Report, p.30.
(183) See reference 180, executive session testimony of Cuban exile leader.
(184) Ibid.
(185) T.F. Report, tab C, p.19.
(186) I.G. Report, p.18.
(187) Interim Report, ref. 2, p.76.
(188) Ibid.
(189) FBI memorandum, Oct. 18, 1960, to the Director, CIA, from J. Edgar Hoover, subject: "Anti-Castro Activities IS-CUBA,"file No. 109-584-2053.
(190) FBI report, Mar. 8, 1973, Richard Cain file, 92-12846-11.
(191) Ibid. Cain's superiors dismissed him from office in 1964 when Cain went to trial in a drug case investigation. After 1964, Cain traveled extensively with Giancana throughout the world and also served a 3-year sentence in the Texarkana Federal penitentiary following a 1969 conviction for conspiracy in the 1963 robbery of Franklin Park Bank, Illinois. As a result of the bank robbery Cain became a target of the TOP echelon criminal informant program. Early in his career, Cain established a reputation for experience in sabotage, polygraphs, and electronic surveillance. Cain was reportedly fluent in Italian and Spanish and traveled extensively throughout Latin America. In 1973, Cain was slain in gagland fashion in a Chicago restaurant. See generally FBI file on Richard Scallzetti Cain, file 92-12846. (192) CIA memorandum to FBI, Nov. 4, 1960, to the Director, FBI, from Deputy Director of Plans, CIA, file No. 105-93264-2, subject: Cain.
(193) FBI letterhead memorandum, Nov. 2, 1960, office: Chicago, Ill; subject: Anti-Fidel Castro Activities-Internal Security-Cuba; file No. 105-93264; also contained in Richard Cain file, which was supplied to House Select Committee on Assassinations. See also FBI report, Dec. 1, 1960, Chicago, Ill., subject: Accurate Detective Laboratory, aka, Cain Investigation, file No. 139-1403-3.
(194) Ibid.
(195) Ibid.
(196) FBI blank letterhead airtel, Nov. 3, 1960, to the Director from SAC, Miami, subject: Military and naval Matters-Cuba; file No. 105-93264.
(197) Ibid.
(198) Ibid.
(199) Ibid.
(200) Ibid.
(201) See reference 191.
(202) FBI report, Apr. 11,1961, subject: Arthur James Balletti, p.3, con- tained in House Select Committee on Assassinations request to FBI of Aug.10, 1978. See also Dec.23,1960 FBI interview of Balletti contained in FBI report, Jan.28,1961, Arthur James Balletti, J.W. Harrison, file No.139-1201-15.
(203) FBI report, jan.28,1961, Arthur james Balletti, J. W. Harrison, file No.139-1201-15, p.4 (interview of Edward DuBois).
(204) Outside Contact Report of Support Chief, House Select Committee on Assassinations, Sept. 19, 1978 (J.F.K. Document No. 012367).
(205) Interview of Robert Maheu on June 2, 1961 contained in FBI report, June 9, 1961, subject: Balletti, Unknown Subject; file No. 139-1201-50.
(206) Deposition of Robert maheu, Aug. 8, 1978, p.42 (J.F.K. document No. 012926).
(207) Interim Report, p.79.
(208) Interview of Joseph Shimon, Aug. 17, 1978, p.5 (J.F.K. document No. 013889).
(209) See reference 44, deposition of Robert Maheu, p.46.
(210) Outside contact report of Arthur Balletti, Aug. 14, 1978, p.3 (J.F.K. document No. 010826).
(211) Outside contact report, review of FBI file, Mar. 16, 1979 (J.F.K. document No. 014932).
(212) See footnote 44, deposition of Robert Maheu, p.40.
(213) T. F. Report at p.20. To support the proposition further that organized crime may have had separate plots in progress before the CIA-Mafia plots, it is interesting to note the series of news articles during July and August of 1960 that related a serious "sickness" Castro was combatting. The Cuban Government said the sickness was pneumonia. See articles in the New York Times, July 11, 12, 31, Aug. 1, 7, and 11, 1960.
(214) I.G. Report, p.50.
(215) Id. at p.51.
(216) Ibid.
(217) Id. at p.74, where the CIA states that Maheu is aware of three times that the CIA intervened on Maheu's behalf to prevent any prosecution.
(218) Id. at p.131.
(219) House Select Committee on Assassinations staff interview of Richard Bissell, Dec. 15, 1978 (J.F.K. Document No. 014997).
(220) "Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders," p.74.
(221) Staff interview of Richard Bissell, Dec. 15, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations (J.F.K. document No. 014997).
(222) Ibid.
(223) Ibid.
(224) Ibid.
(225) Ibid.
(226) "Alleged Assassination Plots," p.102.
(227) Id. at p.69. The 1967 Inspector General's report took note of the leverage that those involved in the murder plots had attained as a result of their association with the CIA. In one section of the report (pages 128-129) titled, "Should we try to silence those who are talking or might later?" (emphasis theirs), the Inspector General's Office noted that one or more of the conspirators, most likely John Roselli, was then leaking information about the plots to newsmen Drew Pearson and Jack Anderson. The report discussed the possibility that Agency pressure could be brought to bear on Roselli and the others to preserve the secrecy of the past assassination plots. The report went on to note that, "None of them would have compunctions about dragging in his CIA connection when he was being pushed by law enforcement authorities." (228) Id. at p.133.
(229) Ibid.
(230) Ibid.
(231) Ibid.
(232) Staff interview of Richard Bissell, Dec. 15, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations (J.F.K. Document No. 014997).
(233) "Alleged Assassination Plots," pp. 84-85, 99-103.
(234) Id. at p.100.
(235) Id. at p.101.
(236) Id. at p.106.
(237) Id. at p.105.
(238) Id. at p.102.
(239) Staff interview of Richard Bissell, Dec. 15, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations (J.F.K. document No. 014997).
(240) Ibid.
(241) Ibid.
(242) Ibid.
(243) Ibid.
(244) Ibid.
(245) Ibid.
(246) Ibid.
(247) Ibid.
(248) Ibid.
(249) Ibid.
(250) Ibid.
(251) Ibid.
(252) Book V,p.68.
(253) Castro report, Senator George McGovern (J.F.K.document No. 000593).
(254) See generally, FBI files pertaining to Norman Rothman: File No. 87-57043, file No.97-4030, volumes 3,5,6.
(255) FBI files on norman Rothman; see specifically FBI Interview of Norman Rothman, June 29, 1961, SA John P. Lenchin and George E. Davis, Jr.
(256) Ibid.
(257) Deposition of Norman Rothman, Apr. 6, 1978, p.56 (J.F.K. document No. 007235).
(258) Id. at p.68.
(259) I.G. Report, p.80.
(260) Id. at pp.103-104.
(261) Ibid.
(262) Ibid.
(263) Book V, pp.11-14;I.G. Report, p.105.
(264) I.G. Report, p.105.
(265) Book V, pp.11-14; I.G. Report, p.105.
(266) Outside contact report, Edward Sharp, Department of Justice Special Investigations Division, June 7, 1978 (J.F.K. Document No. 009888).
(267) Interim Report, pp.131-132.
(268) Ibid.
(269) Ibid.
(270) Ibid.
(271) Id. at p.74.
(272) Id. at p.132.
(273) Id. at pp.83-84,133.
(274) Id. at p. 133. The Inspector General sets forth Robert F. Kennedy's partial knowledge of the plots in a similar manner in another section of the 1967 report. In an analysis of the newspaper column by Drew Pearson and Jack Anderson in 1967, in which it was stated that, "Robert Kennedy may have approved (the) plot," the Inspector General's report disagreed with that statement. The report stated: "Not true. He was briefed on Gambling Syndicate-Phase One after it was over. he was not briefed on Phase Two." The report went on to state (pp.118-119) that Pearson and Anderson had "a garbled account of the role played by Robert Kennedy." (275) Interim Report, p.133.
(276) Ibid.
(277) Ibid.
(278) Ibid.
(279) Ibid.
(280) I.G. Report, p.64.
(281) Id. at pp.64-65.
(282) Id. at p.66.
(283) Interim Report, p.134.
(284) Ibid.
(285) Id. at p.103.
Staff Report of the Select Committee on Assassinations U.S. House of Representatives Ninety-fifth Congress Second Session
ROSE CHERAMIE
She related to me that she was coming from Florida to Dallas with women who were Italians or resembled Italians. They had stopped at this lounge . . . and they'd had a few drinks and had gotten into an argument or something. The manager of the lounge threw her out and she got on the road and hitchhiked to catch a ride, and this is when she got hit by a vehicle. (46)
Fruge said the lounge was a house of prostitution called the Silver Slipper.(47) Fruge asked Cheramie what she was going to do in Dallas: "She said she was going to, number one, pick up some money, pick up her baby, and to kill Kennedy."(48) Fruge claimed during these intervals that Cheramie related the story she appeared to be quite lucid.(49) Fruge had Cheramie admitted to the hospital late on November 20.(50)
Submitted by,
PATRICIA ORR, Researcher.
REFERENCES
(1) "The Bizarre Deaths Following JFK's Murder," Argosy. March 1977, Vol. 384, No.8, p.52 (JFK Document No. 002559).
(2) Ibid.
(3) Ibid.
(4) Ibid.
(5) Ibid.
(6) Ibid.
(7) Ibid.
(8) Ibid.
(9) Ibid.
(10) Louisiana State Police Memo, from Lt. Francis Fruge, Parish of St. Landry, April 4, 1967, in (JFK Document No. 013520).
(11) Ibid.
(12) Ibid.
(13) Ibid.
(14) "The Bizarre Deaths. . ." See FN No. 1.
(15) Ibid.
(16) Ibid.
(17) See Anti-Castro Cuban section of the Staff Reports.
(18) East Louisiana State Hospital, Jackson, La., records for Melba Christine Marcades AKA Rose Cheramie, (JFK Document No. 006097).
(19) Ibid.
(20) Ibid. Note: FBI records list Cheramie's (Marcades) birthdate as October 14, 1932, in Dallas, Tex.(See FBI file No.166-1640 in JFK Document No. 012979).
(21) Ibid.
(22) Ibid.
(23) Ibid.
(24) Ibid.
(25) Ibid.
(26) Ibid.
(27) Ibid.
(28) Ibid.
(29) Ibid.
(30) Ibid.
(31) HSCA Contact Report, July 5, 1978, Bob Buras (with Dr. Victor Weiss)
(JFK Document No. 009699).
(32) Ibid.
(33) Ibid.
(34) Ibid.
(35) Ibid.
(36) Ibid.
(37) Ibid.
(38) HSCA Contact Report, April 7, 1978, Bob Buras (with Mr. Francis Louis Fruge), p. 1 (JFK Document No. 014141).
(39) HSCA Deposition of Francis Louis Fruge, April 18, 1978 (JFK Document No. 014570).
(40) Id. at p. 4-5.
(41) Id. at p. 5.
(42) Ibid.
(43) Id. at p. 6.
(44) Ibid.
(45) Id. at p. 8.
(46) Ibid.
(47) Id. at p. 9.
(48) Id. at p.13.
(49) Ibid.
(50) Ibid.
(51) Id. at p.12.
(52) Ibid.
(53) Id. at p.13.
(54) Id. at p.14.
(55) Ibid.
(56) Ibid.
(57) Ibid.
(58) Ibid.
(59) Ibid.
(60) Ibid.
(61) Ibid.
(62) Id. at p. 15.
(63) Id. at p. 17; East Louisiana State hospital, Jackson, La., records for Melba Christine Marcades AKA Rose Cheramie (JFK Document No. 006097).
(64) HSCA Deposition of Francis Louis Fruge, April 18, 1978, p.20 (JFK Document No. 014570).
(65) Id. at p. 22.
(66) Ibid.
(67) Id. at p. 18.
(68) Id. at p. 22.
(69) Id. at p. 23.
(70) Ibid.
(71) Ibid.
(72) Id. at p. 19.
(73) Ibid.
(74) Ibid. Note: Fruge also indicated the Club was called the "Pink Door," although ruby is not known to have ever had a club by this name. See also, Louisiana State Police Memo., April 4, 1967, from Lt. Francis Fruge, Parish of St. Landry, in JFK Document No. 013520).
(75) Id. at p. 20.
(76) Ibid.
(77) Ibid.
(78) Id. at p. 24.
(79) Id. at p. 25.
(80) Id. at p. 27-8.
(81) Id. at p. 27.
(82) Id. at p. 28. See also HSCA Contact Report, April 7, 1978, Bob Buras (with Francis Louis Fruge) (JFK Document No. 0141414).
(83) Id. at p.28.
(84) Id. at p. 28,30.
(85) See Staff Report on Anti-Castro Cuban activity.
(86) Ibid.
(87) Ibid.
(88) Ibid.
(89) See Staff Report on Anti-Castro activity.
(90) Ibid.
(91) See Staff Memo., Rose Cheramie File, contact with Dennis Cronin, U.S. Customs (JFK Document No. 013520).
(92) HSCA Contact Report, June 26, 1978, Marty Daly (with U.S. Customs),
(JFK Document No. 009481).
(93) See FBI file no. 166-1604 for Melba Christine Marcades, Vol. 1 of 1, (JFK Document No. 012979).
(94) Id. at FBI 166-1604-3, February 11, 1966, Enclosure No. 1.
(95) Id. at FBI 166-1604-2, December 14, 1965, Enclosure.
(96) Ibid.
(97) Ibid.
(98) Id. at FBI 166-1604-1, November 23, 1965, p. 1.
(99) Id. at p.3.
(100) Id. at p.2.
(101) Id. at p.4.
(102) Ibid.
(103) Ibid.
(104) East Louisiana State hospital, Jackson, La., records for Melba Christine Marcades AKA Rose Cheramie (JFK Document No. 006097).